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 Della Law and Economics, me ne sono 
invaghito alla magistrale, per 
―colpa‖ dei relatori di questa tesi, e 
ho perseverato con un dottorato. In 
questo, mi sento fortunato. Non solo 
per i maestri che ho avuto. Ma anche 
per essermi potuto infilare in questo 
percorso formativo tra gli ultimi 
studenti, prima che il percorso stesso 
chiudesse. Spero che il lettore di 
questa tesi possa riconoscere, di 
riflesso, un po‘ di valore al percorso 
che ho potuto seguire. E spero anche 
che possa apprezzare come il tutto, 
la law and economics, sia diverso dalla 
somma delle parti, un po‘ di diritto 
ed un po‘ di economia.  
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INTRODUZIONE 
 
Questa tesi si dipana lungo due dimensioni, una geografica, l‘Unione 
europea, e l‘altra metodologica, la law and economics. La dimensione 
geografica si ritrova nel fatto che i temi trattati afferiscano tutti 
all‘analisi economica del diritto europeo, sia pubblico che privato. 
Questa scelta è stata la conseguenza inevitabile dell‘aver potuto 
spendere tanto tempo in un osservatorio privilegiato sul mondo 
peculiare dei policymakers comunitari, il Centre for European Policy 
Studies di Bruxelles.  
L‘altro filo conduttore è, ovviamente, la law and economics. Il metodo 
della law and economics mi ha permesso di spaziare su temi diversi, 
mantenendo una bussola costante, che è consistita nella domanda 
―quali sono gli effetti nella realtà di questa norma o istituzione?‖. 
Fissati i due fili conduttori, è il momento di dipanare gli argomenti 
specifici che compongono questa tesi.  
Il primo articolo discute la governance del processo legislativo 
dell‘Unione europea, ed in particolare uno strumento orizzontale, 
l‘Impact Assessment. L‘Impact Assessment, corrispondente 
nell‘ordinamento italiano all‘Analisi di Impatto della 
Regolamentazione consiste in una metodologia che, partendo 
dall‘analisi dello status quo e dagli obiettivi che il decisore politico si 
prefissa, permette di elaborare quali saranno gli effetti di una 
proposta normativa in termini, anche se imprecisi, di costi e benefici. 
Il paper presenta un‘analisi dell‘efficacia con cui la Commissione 
europea usa l‘Impact Assessment per guidare il policy cycle europeo. La 
risposta, in breve, è che la Commissione usa in maniera abbastanza 
efficace l‘Impact Assessment, anche se sussistono ancora alcuni punti 
critici su cui intervenire. Vale la pena precisare come non si tratti di 
un articolo di scienze politiche, ma di diritto ed economia, in 
particolare di meta law and economics, in quanto non viene analizzata 
una norma specifica, ma un‘istituzione – nel senso Northiano del 
termine – che regola la produzione di altre norme. E in questi termini 
si muove una vasta letteratura, specialmente nord americana, che si 
dedica all‘analisi giuseconomica della cost-benefit analysis e del 
Regulatory Impact Assessment.  
 5 
 
Il secondo articolo si occupa di Google, più precisamente del caso 
antitrust contro Google iniziato dalla Commissione europea. Nel 
dettaglio, l‘articolo sviluppa in primo luogo una critica alla teoria dei 
mercati bilaterali, i two-sided markets, ed in secondo luogo tenta di 
rispondere alla domanda se Google operi in un two-sided market. La 
risposta, ancora una volta in breve, è ―probabilmente no‖. L‘articolo 
prosegue proponendo una teorizzazione alternativa di Google come 
―supermercato‖ dei dati personali raccolti dagli utenti, dati personali 
che vengono poi monetizzati tramite la pubblicità mirata associata ai 
risultati di ricerca. Trasformare Google da un two-sided market ad una 
catena verticale del valore comporta risultati interessanti dal punto 
di vista dell‘analisi antitrust, in particolare per quanto riguarda una 
reale comprensione dei confini del mercato rilevante nell‘ecosistema 
di internet. 
Il terzo articolo analizza una classe di imprese, gli intermediari di 
dati personali, le quali popolano in maniera trasversale numerosi 
settori dell‘economia, dai motori di ricerca, al cloud computing, dai 
social network ai supermercati. La domanda di ricerca consiste 
nell‘esplorare se la regolazione economica tratti in maniera uniforme 
questa classe di imprese, e la risposta, in breve, è stata ―no.‖ 
Nell‘argomentare questa analisi, vengono presentanti tre casi studio 
che dimostrano come la concorrenza e lo sviluppo di certi modelli di 
business dipenderanno dalle scelte normative che il legislatore 
europeo vorrà fare in maniera di privacy. 
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IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND THE POLICY 
CYCLE IN THE EU 
Giacomo Luchetta* 
 
Abstract 
With the Communication on Smart Regulation issued in October 
2010, the European Commission tried to foster a better management 
of the whole policy cycle. According to that Communication, 
amending policy proposals must be preceded by an ex post 
assessment of the current situation, allowing ―closing the policy 
cycle‖. This paper tries to answer the question whether the EU 
Impact Assessments System is fit to steer and close the policy cycle, 
and what is the relation between ex ante IA and ex post evaluations 
―on the ground‖ so far.  This is done via a macro and micro analysis, 
based on scorecard approach and three case studies, comparing the 
EU IA system performance with a theoretical benchmark derived 
from the EU policy document and process.  The paper concludes that 
the EU Impact Assessment system, as it is currently designed and 
implemented, it is not yet fit to steer and close the policy cycle. To 
achieve this goal, all the analytical and empirical layers of the policy 
cycle should be fully dealt with since the ex ante phase. 
                                                 
*  A version of this article has been published in the European Journal of Risk 
Regulation, Vol. 4/2012, pp. 561-575.  
 This article has been presented at the 4th Annual Conference of the Society for 
Benefit-Cost Analysis: ―Expanding the Scope of Benefit-Cost Analysis: Practical 
Applications and Analytical Frontiers‖, Washington, 21-22 October 2011; and at 
SIDE-ISLE (Italian Society for Law and Economics) 7th Annual Conference, 
University of Turin, 16/17 December 2011.  
 I am very grateful to Alessandra Arcuri and Andrea Renda for their dedicated 
and thorough guidance. Thanks also to Rosamaria Bitetti, Danilo Samà, Lorna 
Schrefler, and Felice Simonelli for their kind comments and support throughout 
the research. Finally, my gratitude goes to the two anonymous reviewers who 
fostered the quality of this article. 
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1 Introduction 
With the Communication on Smart Regulation issued in October 
2010 (Commission 2010), the European Commission tried to foster ex 
post evaluation of EU legislation, aiming at ―closing the policy cycle‖, 
that is connecting ex ante and ex post evaluation in a meaningful 
continuum. This Communication is the latest step of the Smart 
Regulation strategy, which has been promoted as an overarching 
goal by the European Commission since 2002. Constantly throughout 
the years, and through a series of different approaches and 
communications, Impact Assessment (IA) has been picked as the 
main tool of this strategy, aimed at achieving better lawmaking and 
simplification. 
Smart Regulation, or, as it was formerly known until 2010, Better 
Regulation, is an EU overarching regulatory policy which was born 
in the U.S., and then exported, via the UK, to the EU from 1986 
onwards (Renda 2006). From a theoretical perspective, Better 
Regulation is a strategy aimed at managing the lifecycle of law, from 
lawmaking to enforcement. Such a strategy may pursue four main 
ambitions (Radaelli and Meuwese 2009): 
1) to increase the role of evidence in lawmaking; 
2) to improve consultation of affected stakeholders; 
3) to increase competitiveness by drafting and implementing 
better, i.e. more efficient, regulation; 
4) to increase the legitimacy of the regulatory agency. 
As already recalled, the Commission Communication from October 
2010 focuses on closing the policy cycle.  As it can be inferred from 
the EU lawmaking process and the Communication itself, the 
―smartly-regulated‖ policy cycle is composed of the following 
elements: 
1) stock-taking exercise, that is ex post evaluation of the existing 
legislative framework; 
2) public consultation; 
3) ex ante IA; 
4) draft of the proposal; 
5) legislative procedure; 
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6) transposition and implementation;1 
7) enforcement.2 
Better Regulation strategies are implemented via several tools, such 
as IA, simplification programmes, methodologies for choosing 
alternative regulatory methods, public consultation, risk-based 
enforcement, ex post evaluation, and organisational adjustments 
(Mandelkern 2001; OECD 2002). Among these tools, the European 
Commission picked the IA as the most important, also as a meta-tool 
to promote other instruments. 
The scope of the EU IA system is very broad when compared to that 
of e.g. the US or EU Member States (ECA 2010). According to the 
European Commission Guidelines, the following acts must undergo 
IA: 
all legislative proposals of the Commission's Legislative and Work 
Programme (CLWP) […] all non-CLWP legislative proposals which have 
clearly identifiable economic, social and environmental impacts […] and […] 
non-legislative initiatives […] which define future policies. (Commission 
2009)  
IAs are carried out by the lead Directorate General (DG), which is 
responsible for the act. Therein, the policy unit competent for the 
relevant policy area drafts the IA. Several DGs, especially those 
producing a large number of IAs, created a unit responsible for the 
supervision of all IAs, and issued more detailed internal guidelines 
(TEP 2007). The Secretariat-General of the European Commission 
(SG) also provides support for IA drafting. From the start, an Impact 
Assessment Steering Group must be set up, where all the DGs with a 
stake in the proposal have a seat, including the SG. The steering 
group is the forum where other Commission services can monitor 
and influence the IA. 
Once an IA is finalised, it is submitted to the Impact Assessment 
Board (IAB), an oversight body established in 2007 pertaining to the 
SG (Commission 2011). The IAB may recommend minor or major 
changes. If major changes are recommended, the draft IA must be re-
                                                 
1  Transposition refers to the incorporation of an EU norm in the national/local 
acquis. Implementation refers to the application of the EU norm, or the 
national/local norm transposing it, by national/local public administrations. 
2  Enforcement refers to prosecution of violations of EU norms, or national/local 
transposition norms, both vis-à-vis the Member States and third parties. 
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submitted to the IAB. If the draft IA turns out to be still 
unsatisfactory, the IAB issues a second negative opinion. In any case, 
the College of Commissioners can decide to adopt the IA and the 
related act, although ―in principle a positive opinion from the IAB is 
needed before a proposal can be put forward for Commission 
decision‖ (ECA 2010). 
EU IAs must appraise three kinds of impacts: economic, social, and 
environmental. This obligation is mostly fulfilled, although the 
economic impacts are analysed more extensively (ECA 2010). In the 
whole set of IAs carried out from 2003 to 2009, economic impacts 
were assessed in 90% of the cases; social impacts in 59% of the cases; 
and environmental impacts in 85% of the cases.3 Besides, EU IAs 
must be carried out according to the principle of proportionate 
analysis: the depth and scope of the analysis must be functional to 
the significance of the impacts, the political relevance of the act, and 
the stage of political development (Commission 2010).  
According to the European Commission IA Guidelines (Commission 
2009: 45-49), policy options should be evaluated based on three 
criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence. No hierarchy is 
provided among these three criteria. Quantitative analysis, if 
provided, should underpin the choice of the policy option, but there 
is no obligation to select the preferred option based on quantified 
costs and benefits. On paper, quantification and monetisation is 
required, except in the cases in which it is not feasible (Commission 
2009: 48). In practice, the IA Guidelines and the IAB allow European 
Commission officers to choose between a qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. The reason why this leeway is offered is that 
IAs concern primary legislation rather than technical secondary 
legislation, and, as a consequence, full monetisation and 
quantification is less often practicable (Radaelli et al. 2010: 93-95). 
This paper tries to answer the question whether the EU IA system is 
fit to steer and close the policy cycle. First, Section 2 frames the 
discussion about IA as a tool to govern political agency relationships 
and describes the agency relationships in the EU lawmaking process. 
Section 3 describes a theoretical construction of the EU policy cycle, 
                                                 
3  Source: CEPS EU IA Database. Infra note 4. 
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and then the EU IA system is empirically compared against this 
theoretical benchmark in Section 4 by: 
1) analysing data from a database of EU IAs created by the Centre 
of European Policy Studies, where all EU IAs from 2003 to 2009 
are scored according to 202 items;4 
2) assessing three case studies in which IAs have been followed by 
an ex post evaluation, to understand to what extent ex ante and 
ex post analyses are and can be consistent, and how the design 
of IAs could be made consistent with the other phases of the 
policy cycle. 
Finally, Section 5 briefly concludes. 
2 Impact Assessment in a Principal-Agent Perspective 
2.1 A theoretical framework 
In this paper IA is constructed as an institution5 which aims at 
shaping behaviours of political actors, by modifying their incentives, 
and allowing governance of relations among these actors. Therefore, 
IA is a meta-norm imposing constraints on political actors. In this 
construction, based on approaches which can be found in both the 
law and economics and political science literature,6 analysing 
principal-agent relationships and transaction costs stemming from 
these relationships is crucial to understand the role of IA. IA can be 
seen as a mechanism to govern agency relationships among political 
actors, structuring political relationships, and reducing the cost of 
negotiation and monitoring.  
IA, or a similar institution, is usually mandated when the power to 
draft primary legislation (as in the EU) or to enact secondary 
legislation (as in the US) is delegated to a third party. In this 
                                                 
4  The database was created by the Centre for European Policy Studies, under the 
supervision of Dr. Andrea Renda. The database is currently unpublished, on file 
with the author. Data are partly reported in Renda 2011. The methodology is 
similar to that described in Cecot et al. 2008. 
5  The term ―institution‖ refers to North‘s (1990) definition of institutions as 
―humanly devised constraints‖. 
6  I refer i.a. to Adler and Posner 1999, 2000; Radaelli et al. 2010; Renda 2011. This 
approach builds also upon the ―transaction-cost politics‖, cf. the seminal 
contribution of Williamson (1999), Dixit (1996), and Epstein and O‘Halloran 
(1999). 
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relationship, the principal is the legislator, whilst the European 
Commission or the Federal Agencies are the drafting agents. The 
choice to delegate law drafting can be analysed within the 
framework of transaction cost analysis, as a ―make-or-buy‖ decision 
(Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999). Rational political actors may decide 
to delegate if, from their perspective, the benefits of delegation are 
higher than costs. In this context, costs mainly consist of: 
1) monitoring costs; 
2) the risk that the delegated body pursues different goals; 
3) the impossibility to reward constituencies or stakeholders via 
lawmaking.7  
Benefits mainly consist of: 
1) the possibility to use specialised assets, i.e. the knowledge of the 
drafting body; 
2) political relief, that is the opportunity to eventually switch 
responsibility, accountability, and therefore any political 
stigma.  
In this view, IA is an institution aimed at reducing transaction costs 
and at governing the dialogue between the principal(s), that is the 
elected legislator, and the drafting agent, that is the non-elected 
agency. It reduces information asymmetry between the principal and 
the agent by disclosing information (Adler and Posner 1999). IA also 
reduces the costs of monitoring by making goals and expected 
outcomes of regulation more evident. Eventually, it enhances the 
coherence of the political system, ensuring both that delegated norms 
pursue the goals they are intended to pursue, and that single norms 
are coherent with the goals set by the main political actors.  
Majone also adopts a principal-agent approach, but reaches a 
somehow different conclusion. According to him, the principal-agent 
model is not fit to explain the choice to delegate the drafting of 
primary legislation to the European Commission as the agent. He 
considers delegation in this context as a tool to enhance the 
credibility of Member States‘ commitment towards EU integration, 
rather than to reduce transaction costs. The European Commission 
would then be the fiduciary rather than the agent of the Member 
                                                 
7  This is not a cost for the society, but only for the delegating body.  
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States (Majone 2001a, b). This can be held true when it comes to the 
power of agenda-setting, which is exclusive ―property‖ of the 
Commission. Nevertheless, when it comes to lawmaking, Member 
States retain, through the Council of the European Union, the last say 
on the legislative text which the Commission has been delegated to 
draft; therefore the principal-agent relationship can be considered as 
best suited to describe this delegation mechanism. 
Among the possible approaches, throughout this paper, IA is 
considered a coherence-enhancing tool, rather than as pro-efficiency 
(McGarity 1998; Renda 2011). Hereinafter, coherence has a double 
meaning: internal coherence, that is coherence between each policy 
and its objective; and external coherence, that is coherence between 
each policy and the wider political context. In these meanings, 
coherence is a wider concept than efficiency. If cost-minimisation, i.e. 
efficiency, is one of the objectives of the political system, IA can 
enhance its achievement. Nevertheless, a political system may use IA 
to coherently pursue any chosen objective. 
Mainstream analysis considers IA as a tool for efficient policy-
making, which increases the net welfare of the community (Arrow et 
al. 1996). Nevertheless, this is more theory than reality, especially in 
the EU. The European Commission acknowledges that IAs 
―increased transparency and accountability, and promoted evidence-
based policy making‖, and ―improved the quality of legislation‖, 
with no reference to efficiency or the maximisation of any welfare 
criterion (Commission 2010:2-3). Indeed, Jabko (2004) argues that the 
EU regulatory state is not based on the pursuit of any efficiency 
criterion, but rather on practical coherence. In any case, even if 
efficiency were the ultimate goal of an IA system, any effect would 
hardly be measurable (Wölfl et al. 2009). As Coglianese (2002) points 
out, any empirical analysis would have to compare net benefits of the 
decision taken within an IA system with an impossible 
counterfactual, that would be a decision taken without the help of 
economic analysis. Empirical research in this respect is very 
underdeveloped (Radaelli and De Francesco 2007; Hahn and Tetlock 
2008). 
In conclusion, the importance of IA does not reside in ensuring that 
regulation maximises net benefits, or any other measure of efficiency. 
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IA benefits stem from the governance of complex relationships 
among political actors and stakeholders, triggering political 
coherence. Although disagreement can arise on this construction of 
the IA system, this argument can be at least accepted a fortiori: even if 
the IA system failed to increase efficiency, it would nevertheless 
promote policy coherence. 
2.2 Agency relationships in the EU lawmaking process 
In the EU, IAs are carried out by the European Commission on both 
non-binding acts and binding proposals. The European Commission 
is the only institution enjoying the right of initiative in the EU system 
in all but marginal cases.  
In the legislative process, the European Commission can be 
considered the kernel of a web of agency relationships, both external 
and internal (Radaelli and Meuwese 2010; Radaelli et al. 2010). Based 
on the structure of the EU institutional architecture, of the European 
Commission, and on the functioning of the lawmaking process, five 
agency relationships have been identified, and are described below. 
They are categorized as either internal or external. As we will see 
below, the European Commission uses the IA as a tool to govern 
these agency relationships, both the external and the internal ones. 
Figure 1 – The External Agency Relationships 
 
Source: Author‟s Own Elaboration 
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The two external agency relationships are: 
1. Agency relationship 1. The European Commission is the agent 
of the Member States, which originally delegated some 
legislative powers to it. The Member States subsequently act as 
legislators, being part to the Council of the European Union. 
The European Commission is also the agent of the European 
Parliament in putting forward proposals.  
2. Agency relationship 2. The European Commission is the agent 
of EU stakeholders. Although it faces no political accountability 
strictu sensu, since it is not an elected body, it is responsive to 
stakeholders‘ claims, both directly and through the mediation 
of national political bodies. 
Legislative proposals are drafted by the competent policy units 
within each DG. They are subsequently endorsed by the DG at the 
top administrative and political level, i.e. by the Commissioner. 
Finally, legislative proposals are collectively approved by the College 
of Commissioners. In this context, two internal agency relationships 
arise: 
3. Agency relationship 3. Policy officers are agents of the DG, i.e. 
of the apex of the hierarchy; 
4. Agency relationship 4. The DGs are agents of the European 
Commission, whose apex is represented by the President of the 
Commission, assisted by the Secretariat-General. 
Furthermore an agent-agent relationship is relevant in this 
framework: 
5. Agency relationship 5. When competences of two or more DGs 
overlap, DGs use IAs to monitor and steer policy initiatives, by 
cooperating in the drafting and by participating in the Impact 
Assessment Steering Group.  
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Figure 2 – The Internal Agency Relationships 
 
Source: Author‟s Own Elaboration 
As highlighted below in the Introduction, the EU IA system is built 
around these agency relationships: i) the legislators use the IA to 
obtain information about the Commission proposals; ii) the 
stakeholders participate to the IA via the consultation; iii) each DG 
monitors the policy officers in charge of drafting the proposal and 
the IA; iv) the President of the European Commission monitors each 
DG via the Secretariat-General; and v) when competences are shared, 
DGs monitor each other through the Impact Assessment Steering 
Group. After having described the theoretical context and the 
working of the EU IA system, next sections will be devoted to define 
the EU policy cycle and empirically assess whether the IA system is 
fit to steer and close it, according to the desiderata of the European 
Commission. 
3 The Relationship between Impact Assessment and the 
Policy Cycle at the EU Level 
This paper aims at assessing whether the IA system is designed to 
steer and close the policy cycle. To answer this question, a 
construction of the EU ―smartly-regulated‖ policy cycle is provided, 
and then the performance of the EU IA system is assessed at macro 
and micro level. 
This construction of the policy cycle consists of two layers: the 
analytical and the empirical. The former answers the question ―what 
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is the policy expected to deliver?‖ The latter answers the question 
―how is the policy expected to deliver‖, focusing on the mechanisms 
and information necessary to ensure and verify its delivery. These 
layers constitute the underpinning structure on which the factual 
steps of the policy cycle, as described in the introduction, take place. 
The analytical layer consists of the logic underpinning the policy 
cycle, or, in other words, the ―software‖ whose instructions indicate 
what a policy is supposed to achieve and how it is embedded in the 
wider political discourse. This layer of the EU policy cycle includes 
three analytical objects: 
1) the objectives of the policy; 
2) the relation between the policy and the overarching political 
goals;  
3) the outcomes of the policy (or, in the ex ante phase, the expected 
impacts). 
The empirical layer is the ―hardware‖ on which the analytical layer 
can run. Although the latter is the backbone of the policy cycle, any 
policy would remain an empty box without the mechanisms to 
transform it into reality and to proceed with its verification. These 
mechanisms are:  
4) the institutional setting for transposition, implementation and 
enforcement; 
5) the provisions for monitoring and evaluation. 
These mechanisms require the availability of information on the 
status quo, the application of the policy, and the outcomes delivered, 
and therefore are called ―empirical‖. When information is not yet 
(fully) available, the policymaker defines how data will be made 
available and collected alongside of these mechanisms. 
Availability and accuracy of data is important for the policy cycle for 
at least three reasons (Jacobs 2006: 31-32; TEP 2007: 68-80; European 
Commission 2010: 7). First, it is one of the main drivers of quality of 
ex ante and ex post assessment, and of the whole policy cycle 
management. Secondly, lack of data increases the risk of capture by 
the most informed party, i.e. usually the addressees of the norm. 
Thirdly, lack of data and of a design of data collection mechanisms 
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from the start of the policy cycle hinders its closing via ex post 
assessment. 
In a well-designed policy cycle, the analytical and empirical layers 
inform each other. Monitoring and evaluation, although naturally 
part of the ex post assessment and of the empirical layer, needs to be 
considered since the ex ante assessment. ―The choice of which data to 
collect and the data collection method are not isolated decisions in 
the regulatory process, because they influence the whole process‖ 
(Jacobs 2006). Information is retrieved and/or collected purposely to 
measure the outcomes and the achievement of the objectives, and at 
the same time definition and operationalisation of objectives is made 
keeping in mind, prospectively, which monitoring and evaluation 
tools and information are or can be available.  
In the next section, each of the elements of the policy cycle will be 
analysed, providing the empirical assessment of how it has been 
treated so far in the EU IA system, both at micro and macro level. 
4 EU Impact Assessment and the Policy Cycle: an 
Empirical Assessment 
4.1 Methodology and case selection 
This section analyses the constituting elements of the analytical and 
empirical layers of the policy cycle and empirically assesses how EU 
IAs deal with them on two level: macro and micro. 
The macro analysis looks at the EU IA system from an aggregate 
point of view. This analysis is based on data retrieved from the CEPS 
database.8 This macro analysis, i.e. the analysis of the whole IA 
production via a scorecard approach, allows for a bird-eye view of 
the system. It can answer simple questions, that are Yes/No 
questions, on the whole set of IA production, and in this sense is a 
unique tool to analyse general trends in EU IAs without having to 
recur to any case-selection (Dunlop et al. 2010). 
The micro analysis aims at providing more specific information on 
how certain aspects have been dealt with in three case studies, 
                                                 
8  See supra note 4. 
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discussing the positive and negative effects of a proper or improper 
management of the elements of the policy cycle.9 The choice of case 
studies for the micro analysis tried to cover different typologies of 
acts:  
1) a decision implementing an expenditure programme: the 7th 
Framework Programme on R&D, hereinafter ―Decision on 
FP7‖;10 
2) a non-binding communication on biodiversity, hereinafter 
―Communication on biodiversity‖;11 
3) a general regulation on the tariffs for mobile roaming services, 
hereinafter ―First‖ or ―Second Roaming Regulation‖.12  
Case studies were selected among those acts which underwent both 
IA and ex post assessment, which are in limited numbers. Indeed, the 
IA system is relatively ―young‖, as it was launched in 2003. One to 
two years are needed for approval by the legislators, and monitoring 
and evaluation can take place only some time after the act has been 
finalized. Therefore, the focus had to be on the earliest IAs, whose 
quality can be lower compared to more recent documents. Another 
limitation is that no IAs on directives can already be part of the 
sample, since implementation would take about two additional 
years. This affects the results of the empirical analysis, because it can 
be reasonably assumed that the management of the policy cycle is 
more complex for double-layered acts, such as directives. 
This empirical analysis is not meant as an evaluation of the EU IA 
system. Indeed, the focus on closing the policy cycle is posterior to 
the most recent IA Guidelines. Nevertheless, such an analysis points 
out which policy cycle aspects are dealt properly in the IA system 
                                                 
9  In this section, aspects of case studies have been reported only when relevant to 
support specific points of the analysis. In a longer version, on file with the 
author, the whole policy cycle of the case studies was analysed. 
10  Decision No 1982/2006/EC concerning the 7th Framework Programme for 
research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013). 
11  Communication from the Commission: Halting the Loss of Biodiversity by 2010 
and Beyond. Sustaining ecosystem services for human well-being. 
COM(2006)216. 
12  Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 on roaming on public mobile communications 
networks within the Community; Regulation (EC) No 544/2009 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 on roaming and Directive 2002/21/EC on e-
communications. 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
      Tesi di dottorato di Giacomo Luchetta, discussa presso 
l‘Università LUISS Guido Carli, soggetta a Licenza Creative 
Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere derivate 3.0 
Antitrust and Regulation in the EU  
Impact Assessment and the Policy cycle in the EU 
 
and which are not; and therefore it highlights where more attention 
and effort is needed. In this sense, it provides a tentative map of 
what would help to transform the IA system into a tool to manage 
and close the whole policy cycle.   
4.2 Objectives 
Agreement on goals is a pre-requisite of any transaction among 
principals and agents (Milgrom and Roberts 1994). If goals are not 
clear, any institution aimed at managing principal-agent 
relationships, such as IA, cannot fulfil its role. (Meuwese 2008: 35). 
At the same time, Majone (1996: 294) notes that coherence among 
objectives and outcomes, what he calls ―accountability by results‖, 
―cannot be enforced when the objectives are too vague or too broad‖. 
For these reasons, the clear definition of goals is essential for non-
majoritarian institutions, such as the European Commission, to act 
legitimately (Schrefler 2010: 310). 
In this construction of the policy cycle objectives are the key aspect of 
the analytical layer. To go on with the software metaphor, they are 
like the operating system of the policy cycle. Proper objectives meet 
the following requirements (Commission 2009): 
1) are clear; 
2) make clear how the outcomes of the norm contribute to the 
goals (outcome-objective relationship); 
3) are embedded in the wider political context (objective-overall 
goals relationship); 
4) are operationalised in a series of sub-targets which are 
measurable. 
A proper definition of objectives also presupposes a hierarchy, what 
the European Commission (2009: 27) defines as ―general‖, ―specific‖, 
and ―operational‖ objectives. General objectives are linked to Treaty-
based goals, such as ―integrating the Single Market for e-
communications‖. Specific objectives refer to how the specific policy 
contributes to certain aspects of a Treaty-based goal, such as 
―reducing cross-border differences in roaming tariffs‖. Operational 
objectives are defined in terms of deliverables of the specific policies, 
such as ―ensuring that roaming tariffs in each Member State are not 
10% higher than the EU average‖. 
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Policy objectives are not part of the ex ante assessment in real terms: 
they are described in the IA, but they are not ―assessed‖ or 
―compared‖. They logically precede the IA and they are not the 
outcome of any economic analysis (Renda 2011: 226). They may be 
influenced by elements endogenous to the policy cycle, such as 
evidence stemming from an ex post evaluation, or by elements which 
are exogenous to it, such as, an overarching goal or stakeholders‘ 
pressure. 
Once the objectives are fixed, the other elements follow, such as the 
expected outcomes, and the monitoring and evaluation scheme. IAs 
can be considered the appropriate lawmaking procedure to manage 
the policy cycle because, in principles, all its elements can be written 
down in it, as already pointed out in nuce by the Mandelkern 
Group13 and reaffirmed by the Communication on Smart Regulation.  
From the point of view of the macro-analysis, the EU IA system 
performs quite well in the proper definition of objectives. The 
definition of objectives is considered a key aspect by the European 
Commission (2009: 26-28) IA Guidelines and their importance is 
stressed in several respects. Relevance in the Guidelines corresponds 
to a good performance in the scorecard. As shown in Figure 3, the 
data extracted from the CEPS database shows that almost every IA 
defines some objectives, and the large bulk of IA defines specific 
objectives. Performance is poorer concerning operational objectives. 
This could be problematic because operational objectives are usually 
those that can be better measured; therefore, a lack of their definition 
in the IA can hinder any subsequent evaluation. Nevertheless, I shall 
remember that the database includes IAs on both binding and non-
binding acts. For the latter, definition of operational objectives is 
often impossible or inappropriate. Limiting the analysis to binding 
acts, the CEPS database reports that the share of IAs defining 
operational objectives in the period 2003-2009 is 52.5%, almost 9% 
higher than in the whole sample, though still insufficient. 
                                                 
13  In November 2000, Ministers of Public Administration established a high-level 
advisory group on better regulation, chaired by Dieudonné Mandelkern, and 
charged it with producing a report within a year. The Mandelkern Group was 
made up of representatives of the fifteen Member States. Officials from the 
Commissions Secretariat-General also attended. 
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Figure 3 – Macro assessment: Objectives 
Source: Author‟s Own Elaboration on CEPS Database   
Shifting to the level of micro-analysis, the case studies selected help 
shedding some more light. For instance, the IA on the 
Communication on Biodiversity provides an example of poor 
definition of objectives. The document fails to provide a clear 
structure and hierarchy of objectives, and this has been identified ex 
post as a major driver of its failure.14 The objectives are defined in 
very general terms, such as: ―to reinforce EU action to halt the loss of 
biodiversity‖; ―to accelerate towards the recovery of habitats and 
natural systems‖; and ―to optimise the EU contribution towards 
significantly reducing the rate of biodiversity loss‖.15 General 
objectives are not translated into either specific or operational ones.  
This hinders the understanding of the relation between the general 
objectives and the actions included the EU Action Plan for 
biodiversity, and of the relation between expected outcomes and ex 
ante objectives. Since objectives are not defined properly, the 
management of every other phase of the policy cycle becomes very 
difficult. 
                                                 
14 External Study on the Communication on Biodiversity, at pp. 9-16. 
15 IA of the Communication on Biodiversity, SEC(2006)607/2, at p. 44. 
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4.3 The relation Objectives - Overarching Goals 
Since, as it is argued in Section 2, the main goal of the IA system is to 
promote coherence, the connection among objectives and 
overarching political goals becomes naturaliter important: ―the extent 
to which individual legislative proposals contribute to [long-term] 
goals should become a key factor in future ex ante IA‖ (Renda 2011: 
228).  The macro-analysis reported in Figure 4 shows the percentage 
of IAs in which the proposal is linked to a fundamental goal of the 
EU. The share is quite small, showing that there is room to improve 
the use of IAs as a tool for external coherence. 
Figure 4 – Macro assessment: Objectives – Overarching Goals 
Source: Author‟s Own Elaboration on CEPS Database   
4.4 Outcomes – Expected Impacts 
Outcomes are what a policy must deliver to achieve its objectives. In 
the ex ante phase, i.e. before they materialise, they are usually defined 
as expected impacts. As we will see below, their measurement is not 
without contention. 
As in the principal-agent model upon which this construction is 
based outcomes/expected impacts are subordinated to objectives,16 it 
is essential to measure as many impacts as possible among those 
related to the (operational) objectives. That way, the legislator has a 
clear picture not only of the policy objectives, but also of their 
potential achievement.  
                                                 
16  Cf. Section 4.2 supra. 
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The consistency between the measurement of outcomes and the 
other elements of the analytical layer of the policy cycle is then more 
important than accuracy of measurement and full monetisation. The 
Communication on Smart Regulation states that quantification 
should be carried out when possible, with a feasibility constrain due 
to data availability (Commission 2010: 7). Accordingly, the quest for 
monetary values is important, but not crucial. Monetisation can be 
carried out when it is meaningful from a policy cycle perspective, 
without it being the ultimate goal of the EU IA system. Given the 
relevance of objectives, cost-effectiveness would be the natural 
candidate criterion to assess impacts in the ex ante phase (Ogus 2006: 
290). 
In addition to that, the relation between the specific policy and the 
overall political goals influences the choices about which 
outcomes/impacts should be measured. In particular, the ex ante 
assessment might not focus on outcomes, outputs, and means to 
achieve them that have already been set in previous stages of the 
political discourse, to avoid being redundant. Rather, IA may 
contribute to the management of the policy cycle by demonstrating 
whether and how the draft legislation supports the achievement of 
the objectives by resorting to which agreed-upon means, without 
duplication of analysis. 
Attention and resources must not be diverted to measurement of 
non-verifiable outcomes/impacts. Non-verifiable statements bring 
no benefit to the drafting of the law or to the ex post evaluation. On 
the contrary, they stress the external agency relationship no. 1, i.e. 
that between the European Commission and the legislators, by 
increasing the costs of monitoring, up to the point that they cannot 
be monitored at all (Milgrom and Roberts 1994: 283-284; De Geest 
2010). In this sense, non-verifiable statements increase the 
irresponsibility of the drafter, who does not fear any risk of ex post 
assessment of the outcomes, both because of the need to build 
challenging counterfactuals, such as a forecast about a marginal 
increase of GDP,17 and because of the time hiatus between the 
                                                 
17  In theory, increase of GDP can be measured. In practice, it is hardly ever 
possible to build any meaningful counterfactual in which the net impact of a 
single law on the growth of GDP can be verified ex post. 
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analysis and its effects, such as when effects are estimated over an 
e.g. 30-year period. Accordingly, economic analysis may play a major 
role when analytical statements are verifiable, otherwise political 
decisions taken by the principals, i.e. the legislators, could usefully 
step up. 
It is true that long-term and barely-verifiable impacts play an 
important role in several policy domains, e.g. for long-term 
environmental policies. If these impacts are not taken into 
consideration, such long-term policies could be hindered. 
Nevertheless, if impact analysis is well connected to the overarching 
policy goals, the role of non-verifiable statements becomes relatively 
minor. E.g., in EU policymaking, major long-term goals, also for 
environmental policies, are decided at the top political level, that is 
the European Council, based on political reasons and with limited or 
no reference to detailed economic analysis. Then, if outcome/impact 
analysis is to be consistent with these goals, it can usefully highlight 
costs and benefits of the various options to achieve them, rather than 
re-assess their validity.  
Finally, measurement is a costly activity; therefore it is imperative for 
the policymaker to reap benefits out of it (Milgrom and Roberts 1994: 
290-293) in the form of better lawmaking. Therefore, analysis of 
outcomes/impacts should be carried out with the aim to understand 
how to draft better legislative texts, rather than as a purpose in itself.  
In a perfect world, IAs would measure all expected impacts of an act. 
In the real world, this is not the case. The Commission enjoys 
discretion in deciding what impacts should undergo measurement. 
Therefore, the discretion should be consciously recognized, and any 
choice with respect to impact measurement is to be consistent with 
the overall management of the policy cycle. 
From the macro point of view, concerning outcomes and expected 
impacts, the EU IA system has both positive and negative sides. On 
the positive side, European Commission IA Guidelines are quite lax 
when coming to the choice among qualitative and quantitative 
assessment criteria. Accordingly, the EU IA system is not steered 
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towards full monetisation (European Commission 2009: 45-48).18 As 
reported in Figure 5, the analysis of the whole set of EU IAs confirms 
the approach of the guidelines: full monetisation of costs is carried 
out in 28% of the IAs, and full monetisation of benefits in 16%, with 
an upward trend in the recent years. 
Figure 5 – Macro assessment: Monetisation of outcomes 
Source: Author‟s Own Elaboration on CEPS Database   
On the negative side, the temptation to use IA as a tool for the 
Commission to win the support of the legislators, or better as a 
trump card in the political arena, leads to redundant measurement of 
either impacts already clearly embedded in general policy goals, or 
of non-verifiable impacts. The necessity to use IAs as a tool to ―rally 
support for [Commission‟s] proposal‖ was even stressed in the first 
action plan for Better Regulation (Commission 2002: 8) and is 
exemplified by the micro-analysis of the following case study. 
The analysis of impacts in the IA on the Decision on FP7 combines 
qualitative and quantitative elements. Impacts of each action are first 
described in qualitative and rather general terms, such as FP7 will 
―increase competition and drive up the quality of research 
proposals‖ or ―more research will be carried out in Europe, and that 
research will generally be of higher quality‖.19 Then, via an economic 
                                                 
18  For a critical assessment, cf. Renda 2011: 228. 
19  IA of the Decision on FP7, SEC(2005)430, at pp. 7-8. 
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model, quantitative impacts on GDP, employment, and 
competitiveness by 2030 are quantified.  
From the point of view of the management of the policy cycle, the 
decision to focus attention and consequently spend resources on the 
quantification of long-term economic indirect impacts can be 
questioned in at least three respects: 
1) modelling these impacts bring few benefits to the quality of 
lawmaking. Most of the features of the proposal, namely the 
specific design of the programme, which is crucial in order to 
produce the desired outcomes in an effective way, are not 
influenced by this analysis. Among the manipulable features of 
the proposal, only the amount of funds available is an 
independent variable considered in the model, whose impact 
can therefore be measured via this approach; 
2) forecasts about impacts up to 2030 on GDP, employment, and 
competitiveness risk being non-verifiable statements. Indeed, 
these outcomes are barely taken into account in the ongoing 
monitoring and evaluation process, although it is focused on a 
large range of outcomes and impacts. The interim report on FP7 
accordingly reads: 
[f]urther questions arise about how to ensure that the undoubted 
achievements of science are translated into impacts – whether 
economic or social - that benefit society at large. […] [I]t is far too 
soon to attempt any comprehensive assessment of the outcomes of 
impact of research which is still in progress from the very first calls of 
FP7.20  
It is highly doubtful that such an assessment will possibly be 
carried out at any time that is compatible with the timing of the 
policy cycle. 
3) the EU had already stated in its Lisbon Strategy that promotion 
of growth and a knowledge-based economy via an increase in 
R&D public expenditure should be pursued; therefore an 
extended analysis of this aspect brings little, if any, added value 
to the political discourse. 
                                                 
20  Interim Evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme, at p. 9. 
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4.5 The Institutional Arrangements for Transposition, 
Implementation and Enforcement 
Having reviewed the analytical objects, we analyse now the 
empirical mechanisms of the policy cycle: implementation and 
enforcement, and monitoring and evaluation. Since norms are 
instruments to change constraints and incentives of actors ―in the 
hope‖ of achieving the desired outcome, the policy cycle must 
include implementation and enforcement aspects (Ogus 2006: 283). 
Indeed, as the OECD highlights: 
High quality regulation management systems […] include the compliance 
and implementation dimensions. […] Regulatory design and implementation 
need to proceed from an understanding of the factors that influence 
awareness, willingness (acceptance), capacity (ability) and actions of 
regulated groups to comply with the intended regulations. (Jacobzone et al. 
2007: 48) 
The push for an EU Better Regulation strategy has come i.a. from 
problems in implementation and enforcement of EU law (Meuwese 
2008: 29). Transposition and implementation are important aspects of 
the EU policy cycle, more than in other legal systems, due to the 
multi-layered constitutional structure (Mandelkern 2001: 65-72). 
Indeed, the EU is unique because, even though its normative powers 
resemble those of a sovereign state, the vast majority of EU law is 
applied indirectly by other administrative bodies, i.e. national or 
local administrations.21 On the contrary, enforcement is a problem 
common to the policy cycle of every legal system. These are the 
reasons why transposition, implementation, and enforcement are 
necessary elements of the EU policy cycle, more prominent than in 
the national contexts, and should accordingly be paid attention to in 
the ex ante assessment (Commission 2009: 43-44, 2010: 7). 
The attention paid by the EU IA system to transposition, 
implementation, and enforcement is quite lower compared to the 
objectives and outcomes, as acknowledged by the Communication 
on Smart Regulation. The European Court of Auditors (2010: 41) 
noticed too that the attention to these aspects is poor and uneven. 
According to its report, ―[IAs] do not, in all cases, give sufficient 
emphasis to implementation arrangements‖, and ―a reference to 
implementation plan was provided in no more than approximately 
                                                 
21  In force of art 4(3) of the Treaty on the European Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
      Tesi di dottorato di Giacomo Luchetta, discussa presso 
l‘Università LUISS Guido Carli, soggetta a Licenza Creative 
Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere derivate 3.0 
Antitrust and Regulation in the EU  
Impact Assessment and the Policy cycle in the EU 
 
half of all reports reviewed‖. The analysis of the enforcement costs is 
also deemed insufficient.  
The micro-analysis of implementation aspects in the IA on the 
Communication on biodiversity shows that they are covered only 
marginally, and not as a self-standing issue, but within the analyses 
of impacts. Implementation and enforcement are referred to only in 
general terms, such as ―national implementation choices will be 
crucial‖.22 This is striking, since most of the actions are actually to be 
carried out by the Member States. In particular, the relation between 
the non-binding nature of the Communication and the need to 
ensure that its actions are implemented by the responsible actors 
remains under-analysed.  
4.6 Monitoring and Evaluation 
Monitoring and evaluation are similar mechanisms, but refer to 
different moments of the policy cycle. Monitoring logically and 
temporally precedes evaluation, dealing with the organisational 
implementation of a policy, and its direct outputs (DG INFSOC 
2011). Evaluation is defined as a ―judgment of interventions 
according to their results and impacts, and the needs they aim to 
satisfy‖ (Commission 2002: 2). That is, policy effects are compared to 
policy objectives and ex ante expectations, on the basis of empirical 
information.  
Monitoring and evaluation are an integral part of the smartly-
regulated policy cycle (Commission 2009: 49, 2010: 4). In particular, 
IAs and ex post evaluation are complementary tools. The IA sets the 
benchmark against which any evaluation is to be carried out, by 
stating policy objectives and expected outcomes, and the institutional 
mechanisms for it. At the same time, ex post evaluation benefits from 
the information provided in the IA and constitutes itself the basis 
upon which building the new IA in case of revision (Renda 2011).  If 
monitoring and evaluation tools are designed since the ex ante phase, 
all policy actors clearly know from the beginning what is going to be 
measured. 
                                                 
22  IA on the Communication on Biodiversity, SEC(2006)607/2, at p. 61. 
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The EU has a wide experience in evaluating expenditure 
programmes, as required by Article 27.4 of the ―Financial 
Regulation‖.23 The same bold approach to the evaluation of general 
norm is still lacking. Indeed, the European Commission IA 
Guidelines have a short and general part on monitoring and 
evaluation provisions (ECA 2010: 49). It is based on the techniques to 
evaluate expenditure programmes, which are then translated into 
hints to evaluate general norms. The lack of targeted guidance 
explains why some DGs created their own internal guidelines for the 
ex post evaluation of legislation (DG MARKT 2008; DG INFSOC 
2011). 
The section on monitoring and evaluation is a mandatory element in 
the structure of IAs, and the macro-analysis shows that it is present 
in almost every IA, as shown in Figure 6. At the same time, the 
inclusion of indicators for monitoring, as suggested in Annex 13 to 
the Guidelines, is steadily increasing over time.  
Figure 6 – Macro assessment: Monitoring and Evaluation   
Source: Author‟s Own Elaboration on CEPS Database   
 
                                                 
23  Council Regulation No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 
general budget of the European Communities. 
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The macro assessment only tells whether the part of monitoring and 
evaluation is present in each IA, but cannot assess its quality, i.e. 
whether it was drafted properly, or only as a ―tick-the-box‖ exercise. 
To perform such an assessment, we present two case-studies below. 
The IA on the Communication on Biodiversity covers monitoring 
and evaluation aspects, providing for a set of headline indicators, 
which are then detailed in Annex 2 to the Communication. 
Nevertheless, the list of indicators does not include any target, nor 
any baseline measurement is foreseen. The absence of targets makes 
the use of indicators much less productive in terms of steering 
different actors. Furthermore, the absence of baseline indicators 
undermines the effort for evaluating the action plan.24 Finally, it is 
not clear how indicators are related to the actions and the specific 
objectives. 
The first and second roaming regulations show a good example of 
how legislators may push for the inclusion of detailed monitoring 
criteria in the legislative act. The Commission‘s proposal for the first 
roaming regulation included a general requirement to monitor its 
outcome and outputs. The legislators went further, detailing in the 
legislative text itself the content of the subsequent evaluation.25  
In the Second Roaming Regulation, the legislators went again 
further, and the legislative text eventually states that: 
1) the monitoring report should be preceded by a public 
consultation; 
2) the Commission should also monitor the quality and 
availability of services, the extent to which consumers have 
benefited from the outcomes of the regulation, and the degree 
of competition.26 
This constitutes a good practice concerning the level of details of 
binding evaluation provisions. This is especially important since the 
legislators will be the addressees of the evaluation, therefore, as 
                                                 
24  External Study on the Communication on Biodiversity, at p. 18. 
25  Article 11 of Regulation 717/2007. 
26  Article 11 of Regulation 717/2007 as amended by Reg. 544/2009. 
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principals, they should instruct the agent as to the content of the 
evaluation process.  
The mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation presuppose the 
availability of data, both ex ante and ex post. The European 
Commission Guidelines consider good data as essential to the IA, to 
define the problem at stake, and to analyse the baseline scenario and 
the prospected impacts (Commission 2009: 18). Nevertheless, they do 
not go into more detail concerning methodologies for data collection 
and analysis. Indeed, this would hardly be possible given that 
availability of information, evidence, and data, is a problem 
idiosyncratic to each IA.  
The European Court of Auditors confirms that availability of data is 
a key challenge for IAs (ECA 2010: 39-40). It notices that the 
European Commission uses to resort to external studies for data 
gathering, whilst internal resources are under-exploited. According 
to the empirical assessment of the IA system carried out by an 
external contractor, the majority of European Commission officers 
interviewed reported that empirical information was often lacking or 
inappropriate, lowering the quality of IAs (TEP 2007: 79-80). The 
most used data sources were consultation, external consultants, 
literature reviews or other sources internal to the European 
Commission. Member States were used as a source of information in 
less than 40% of the IAs, and ex post evaluation in less than 30%. 
Available statistics, both at European and national level, were 
usually of limited help, due to the insufficient level of detail. 
The Commission could create organisational arrangements and 
common databases which can support the attempt to mainstream 
evidence-based policy making. The usefulness of these tools has 
already been pointed out by several international experiences (Jacobs 
2006: 32). Otherwise, the Commission would risk remaining blind, 
both ex ante and ex post, because of paucity of available information. 
Below, we present one case in which data collection was not taken 
into account in the ex ante phase, and a case in which it was. 
The empirical layer of the policy cycle of the Communication on 
Biodiversity has been badly managed, as underlined in the 2010 
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external study.27 A careful analysis of what data were or could be 
available was completely missed in the ex ante phase. The European 
Commission carried out the identification of available data sources 
only in 2009. Many gaps were identified, both at the Commission 
and national level. For some actions, monitoring was eventually 
dropped because there was no possibility to identify relevant data. 
For some other informational needs, the Commission resorted to 
surveying Member States via a questionnaire. Its burdensomeness 
and limited relevance were questioned by the national officers, and, 
in many cases information was simply non-existing because no data 
collection had been foreseen. 
On the contrary, the empirical layer of the policy cycle of the 
Roaming Regulations has been managed properly. This was possible 
because the Commission could rely on the established network of 
national regulatory authorities for e-communications. They already 
had in place mechanisms of market surveillance and close 
relationships with the industry operators (DG INFSOC 2011). The 
network of national authorities has been used as a source of 
information concerning outcomes, the achievement of objectives, and 
the level of compliance with the regulation. For the IA of the second 
roaming regulation, the network also provided the basis for an 
informed analysis of the status quo. 
5 Conclusions 
The main theoretical conclusions of this paper can be summarised as 
follows. First, a view of the IA as a tool for policy coherence has been 
proposed. The IA needs not to be conceived and designed as an 
instrument to promote efficiency in lawmaking, as it delivers large 
benefits also if only its procedural effects are taken into account. 
Mainly, IA governs political principal-agent relationships, thereby 
promoting coherence. This is even more important in the EU, where 
European institutions, Member States, and different parts of the 
European Commission co-operate in the lawmaking process in a 
unique and complex way. If designed and employed to govern 
political principal-agent relationships, IA becomes the key 
                                                 
27  External Study on the Communication on Biodiversity. 
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instrument to steer and close the policy cycle, that is the target fixed 
by the European Commission in its latest Communication on Smart 
Regulation. 
Second, a construction of the policy cycle has been put forward. The 
policy cycle is composed of two main layers: the analytical and the 
empirical. The former answers the question ―what is the policy 
expected to deliver?‖ and includes three analytical objects: objectives, 
relationship between policy objectives and overarching goals, and 
outcomes/expected impacts. The latter answers the question ―how is 
the policy expected to deliver‖, focusing on the mechanisms and 
information necessary to ensure and verify its delivery: 
implementation and enforcement, and monitoring and evaluation. 
Then, an empirical analysis of the EU IA system both at a macro and 
micro level has been performed. From the macro point of view, the 
EU IA system is attentive to the definition of objectives, although it 
could do more in terms of their operationalisation and of the linkage 
with overarching EU policies. The analysis of impacts is rather well-
structured, although it is argued that it should be steered according 
to the needs of the policy cycle, rather than being used as a trump 
card in the political debate. A more careful analysis should definitely 
be devoted to enforcement, transposition, and implementation 
aspects. Progress has been made concerning the inclusion of 
monitoring and evaluation aspects in the IAs. The micro-analysis has 
supported these results, and also shown that, when the empirical 
layer was not properly dealt with, the policymaker remained blind 
about the results of its actions, and was incapable of managing the 
policy cycle.  
Policy conclusions can be drawn from the theoretical construction 
and empirical analysis carried out so far. The EU IA system came a 
long way since its foundation and it is generally appreciated as a tool 
that increased co-ordination, accountability, transparency, and 
openness. Nevertheless, as it is currently designed, it is not yet fit to 
steer and close the policy cycle, as envisaged in the Smart Regulation 
Communication. To achieve this goal, the analytical and empirical of 
the policy cycles should be wholly defined since the ex ante phase, in 
all its elements. Therefore, in the IA more attention should be paid to 
external coherence of the policy, that is its linkage with overarching 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
      Tesi di dottorato di Giacomo Luchetta, discussa presso 
l‘Università LUISS Guido Carli, soggetta a Licenza Creative 
Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere derivate 3.0 
Antitrust and Regulation in the EU  
Impact Assessment and the Policy cycle in the EU 
 
EU goals. Concerning internal coherence, the analysis of impacts 
should be linked to the stated objectives and to what can be 
monitored and evaluated ex post, avoiding non-verifiable statements 
and waste of resources in assessment of impacts which either have 
not any beneficial effect on the lawmaking, or have already been 
assessed at a higher political level. Finally, the policy cycle can be 
closed only if transposition, implementation, and enforcements 
aspects become regular features of the ex ante analysis. In this 
respect, classical law-and-economics tools, such as incentive analysis, 
can be useful in assessing whether and how Member States and other 
final addressees will react to the norm (Renda 2011). The design of 
monitoring and evaluation tools in the ex ante phase should be more 
careful, or ex post assessment will be hindered. Informational needs 
and institutional mechanisms allowing the Commission to collect 
data about policy outcomes should be already pre-set in the IA, and 
detailed provisions on monitoring should be included in the act 
itself. 
All these suggestions do not amount to a revolution of the current IA 
system. It should be fine-tuned to the new objectives that the 
European Commission, in its apex, intends to pursue. To this aim, 
changes to the Guidelines could be proposed, to give a more 
balanced attention to the different aspects of the policy cycle which 
are to be included in the IA. At the same time, the IAB oversight 
could be re-focused on the aspects which have so far received less 
attention, but that in the new perspective become important. A fairly 
sound IA system has been built at the EU level, no doubt about that. 
Now it is time to use it to fully achieve the objectives of the Smart 
Regulation strategy and to ensure coherence of the overall policy 
cycle. 
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IS THE GOOGLE PLATFORM A TWO-SIDED 
MARKET? 
Giacomo Luchetta* 
Abstract 
Probably not. Unlike other platforms, such as operating systems, 
credit cards, or night clubs, where a single transaction is performed 
via the platform, two different transactions take place on Google. 
Users look for search results in exchange of personal data, while 
advertisers look for users' attention, i.e. to be matched with the 
―right‖ user. Whilst operating systems, credit cards, and night clubs 
would be meaningless if either of the two sides were missing, search 
engines (like TV or newspapers) can exist under different market 
configurations. Indeed, in search engines network externalities run 
only from the number of users to advertisers, and not the other way 
around.  
Building upon this analysis, a non-bilateral construction of the 
relevant market where Google operates is proposed. Google operates 
as a retailer of users‘ personal information.  In the upstream market, 
it buys users‘ personal information from large retailers and final 
consumers in exchange of search services or upon monetary 
payment. Then, it uses the personal information collected to sell 
targeted advertising to advertisers in the downstream market. Based 
on this market construction, the allegations against Google are 
analysed as alleged violations of competition law along this vertical 
chain. 
                                                 
*  A version of this article has been submitted to the Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics and is undergoing peer review. It has also been published in the 
eJournal Economics of Networks, Vol. 4, No. 29: Jun 7, 2012. 
 This article has been presented at the 23rd European Regional Conference of the 
and the 3rd PhD Seminar of the International Telecommunications Society, 
Vienna, 1-4 July 2012; at a lunchtime seminar of the IBBT - SMIT, Studies on 
Media, Information & Telecommunication, Vrije Universiteit Brussel on the 29 
of October 2012; and at the SIDE-ISLE (Italian Society of Law and Economics) 
8th Annual Conference, University of Roma Tre, 13/15 December 2012. 
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1 Introduction 
Google entered our daily lives to such an extent that we wonder how 
the world had been previously. Google is the modern version of the 
catalogue of the Library of Babel. Nevertheless, unlike in Borges‘s 
prophecy, the Internet, containing an amount of information which is 
nearly infinite for any human scale, has its own finished catalogue: 
Google. Google is the gateway for the whole of Internet, therefore 
holding the key to one of the most important inventions of the 
twentieth century. Given today state of the art, if Google went down, 
a large part of the Internet would become de facto inaccessible. At the 
same time, if you are not in Google, possibly in a decent position for 
your relevant keywords, you almost do not exist in the online world. 
Although it came into existence quite late compared to its 
predecessors Excite, Lycos and Altavista, Google has established 
itself as the leader of the search engine industry in the early 2000‘s, 
emerging out of the magmatic competition of the 90‘s. It leveraged 
on a new search algorithm which delivered much more accurate 
results, the famous PageRank, and a new business model, based on 
advertising. Google was also ―lucky‖ that other major IT players 
such as Yahoo and Microsoft did not decide early enough to invest in 
the search and search advertising markets, since, at first, these 
markets looked as not-so-profitable as the good old Yellow Pages. 
Google has eventually become the dominant player among Internet 
search engines. And, basically as any other firm which has become 
dominant in a high-tech industry, it has come under the spotlight of 
the antitrust authorities and competition lawyers and economists, in 
a sort of curse of the giants. Still, I claim that its fate may be different 
from that of its predecessors, in particular Microsoft, i.a. because the 
markets in which the Google Search Engine1 operates are not two-
sided. I would provoke the reader by stating that Google is more 
similar to a supermarket than to Microsoft Windows or Visa. Indeed, 
as I try to show in Section 4, Google is a retailer of personal data. 
Personal data are collected from users and then processed to sell 
targeted advertisings to advertisers. To grasp Google, two-sided 
                                                 
1  Throughout the paper, by referring to Google, if not otherwise specified, I refer 
to the Google Search Engine and not to the whole platform. 
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economics is not necessary. Rather, value chain analysis, with some 
specific caveats, provides a more accurate framework. Understanding 
whether Google is a two-sided market is therefore the first research 
question of this paper. The consequential sub-question requires 
reviewing and retrieving a definition of what a two-sided market is. 
The second research question concerns the possible consequences of 
abandoning the two-sided market theory in the Google antitrust 
cases. All major antitrust cases, and Google makes no exception, are 
batteground for different economic theories. The share of the lion has 
so far belonged to the two-sided market theory. The European 
Commission, when clearing the merger Yahoo!/Microsoft, could not 
be more explicit in stating that ―Internet Search engines such as 
www.search.yahoo.com, www.bing.com or www.google.com operate two-
sided platforms serving both search users (for “free”) and advertisers (for 
remuneration).”2 Namely, ―a search engine is a matchmaker connecting 
advertisers and users. Therefore a search engine is a two-sided platform 
where the demands on the two sides are interdependent.‖ Most scholars 
are on the same line too; e.g. Cave e Williams (2011) state that 
―Internet search is a classic two-sided market in which the search engine is 
an intermediary between those searching for information and those placing 
advertisements.‖ Another primary scholar, Evans (2008a), includes 
Google among the examples of two-sided markets, namely among 
audience-makers. Few contributions (i.a. Manne and Wright [2011], 
which is one of the best-grounded analyses of the Google case) have 
tried to cast a doubt over the two-sidedness of Google. 
Honestly, it was not my intention to cast any doubt on the 
mainstream analysis of the Google case. I just wanted to write a 
paper on the Google case, and I was going to do it through two-sided 
economics. Nevertheless, the more I went on with the analysis, the 
more difficult it was to reconcile two-sided economics and the actual 
working of the market in which search engines operate. Therefore, 
going backward, I had to ask myself whether Google was a two-
sided market (probably not) and, subsequently, what two-sided 
markets are from an economic point of view. 
                                                 
2  Commission Decision of 19/02/2010 Case No COMP/M.5727 - Microsoft/ 
Yahoo! Search Business, §47. 
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The feeling I brought back from this backward journey was that the 
literature on two-sided markets is based on assumptions which are 
not fit to frame the Google case. Two-sided markets, which were 
theorized to describe the credit card market – rectius, to defend credit 
card issuers from antitrust allegations – have been the most 
important innovation of the last decade in antitrust economics. As 
any successful innovation, its application spread larger and larger, 
also to markets which were possibly ―not-so-two-sided‖. We 
switched from the risk, denounced by Wright (2004), of using a one-
sided logic in two-sided markets, to that of applying a two-sided 
logic in one-sided markets. 
The literature on two-sided markets conveys two main lessons for 
antitrust economics. The first and more important consists in 
possibly decoupling the assessment of the ―appropriateness‖ of a 
price from marginal costs. The second is that feedback effects among 
the two sides make the assessment of the anticompetitive effects of 
certain conducts more difficult. Both lessons give sound arguments 
against improper antitrust allegations, and possibly explain why 
two-sided economics has become so widespread so fast.3 
Nevertheless, two-sided economics constrains firms‘ behaviours into 
logics which, if used inappropriately, make antitrust analysis deaf to 
the contribution of the literature on business models and on the 
Internet ecosystem. Both streams of literature are very important to 
analyse Google, as any other IT player.  
This paper was born out of these preliminary considerations. Its 
structure reflects the backward journey, and it accordingly starts 
from the analysis of the literature on two-sided markets. Only then I 
try to explain why Google is not a two-sided market, and to 
subsequently propose a different theorisation. This different theory, 
developed from the Google business model, can be applied to all 
firms generating revenues by selling advertising spaces on the basis 
of information collected from users. In a way, this theory represents a 
new method to look at a long list of actors of which create value out 
of users‘ personal information: the intermediaries of personal 
information. 
                                                 
3  Cf. Evans e Schmalensee (2007) and Ordover‘s (2007) comments; cf. also Evans‘s 
introduction to OECD (2009). 
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After many pages devoted to the theoretical analysis, I come to the 
antitrust case, where the non-two-sided theorisation of Google shows 
its value by bringing new insights. First, a clear criterion to define 
Google relevant market and to identify its competitors is developed. 
The analysis explains why Google is more worried by Facebook than 
by Bing, as it  provides a theoretical framework for which search 
engines and social networks compete against each others. In this 
respect, abandoning the two-sided models allows the economic 
reality and firms‘ behaviours to enter and inform the antitrust 
analysis. Besides, the proposed theorisation provides a convincing 
explanation of the reasons why several Google conducts, most 
importantly manipulation of search results, albeit relevant and 
possibly worth of sectoral regulation, can be hardly framed as 
violations of antitrust law. 
Step by step, in Section 2 the journey begins by reviewing the 
literature on two-sided markets to extract a tentative definition.  
Then, in Section 3, I analyse the Google platform and show why it 
does not fit in the proposed definition of two-sided markets. In 
section 4, I put forward my own construction of the Google platform 
as a vertical chain with Constant Unidirectional Network 
Externalities. Finally, Section 5 analyses the allegations against 
Google through the market construction that I propose, and Section 6 
concludes. 
2 Two-sided and Media Markets 
―Two-sided market‖ is a young concept in economic theory. The 
term was first used in 2002 by Rochet and Tirole (2003). Other 
authors (Parker and Van Alstyne 2000; Caillaud and Jullien 2001, 
2003; Evans 2003; Armstrong 2006) contributed to develop this 
concept, albeit using in some cases a different terminology.4 
A two-sided market is a possible representation of a certain set of 
economic transactions. Indeed, two-sided markets were not 
                                                 
4  ―Two-sided market‖, as well as ―multi-sided market‖ is only one of the possible 
names used, and possibly not even the most correct. Many authors (i.a. Hagiu 
and Wright [2011]; Renda [2011]) use the term two- or multi-sided platforms. 
When I use the term ―two-sided market‖, I refer to any other similar expression.  
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discovered in the early 2000‘s. At that moment, several scholars 
developed a model which was fit to describe a set of economic 
phenomena, whose importance was growing. Of course, two-sided 
markets had existed well before they were termed so, and 
economists had already analysed the markets which are now defined 
as two-sided.5  
At the origin of this stream of economic literature, scant attention 
was devoted to defining what a two-sided market is. Rochet and 
Tirole (2006), in their first attempt to sum up the new stream of 
literature, observed that it ―had much of a ‗You know a two-sided 
market when you see it‘ flavor.‖ Economists had it clear that there 
was a larger and larger set of markets in which the behaviour of 
firms was at odds with the established economic theory. Therefore, 
scholars tried to show what specificities they perceived in these 
markets, and then modelled these specificities to predict the 
behaviour of firms within this framework. Using this new class of 
models, economists analysed situations which could not be 
satisfactorily explained before, such as the fact that setting a price 
equal to 0 or negative was a profit-maximising strategy. In addition 
to that, relevant policy conclusions, e.g. in terms of competition law 
or business strategies, were drawn out of this framework.  
As said above, the early contributors to this theorisation identified 
several specific features of two-sided markets. Parker and Van 
Alstyne (2000) observed that when firms produce two 
complementary products sold in different markets, it is reasonable to 
underprice one of them to maximise profits. This is due to inter-
market network externalities, that is positive externalities created in 
one market and enjoyed by the participants of the other. They also 
observed that such a firm behaviour can be partly due to the unique 
properties of information goods, namely that marginal costs are 0 or 
negligible. Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) analogously remarked 
that two-sided markets are characterized by indirect network 
externalities, that is a relationship between the numerosity of 
participants in one side and the utility enjoyed by the participants in 
the other. They use the qualifying ―indirect‖ to distinguish these 
                                                 
5  Cf. Filistrucchi (2012) for a short account of earlier studies on two-sided 
markets. 
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network externalities from those affecting the same market (as 
introduced by Katz and Shapiro 1986). These network externalities 
create the ―chicken-egg dilemma‖: market players need both sides of 
the market on board. Then, they also observed that in these markets 
price discrimination is commonly practiced between the two sides. 
Armstrong (2006) also focused on cross-side externalities: although 
in many markets firms compete for two or more groups of 
customers, in a set of interesting cases the benefit enjoyed by a class 
of customers depend on the numerosity of the other class. He also 
allowed for this externality to be negative, as in the case of 
newspapers, where readers have a negative preference for 
advertisements. Besides, he introduced the concept of multi-homing, 
that is the participation of users to multiple platforms. Evans (2003) 
identified three conditions for two-sided markets organised via 
platforms to emerge: i) existence of two or more distinct group of 
customers; ii) existence of positive externalities in force of the 
connection or coordination of the two groups; iii) the need of an 
intermediary to internalise the externalities.  Rochet and Tirole (2003) 
also focused on network externalities. They state that many, if not 
most of, markets with network externalities are two-sided markets. 
The class of two sided-markets is a sub-class of markets with 
network externalities, namely those markets in which a platform can 
effectively (i.e. without side-payments among users) perform cross-
subsidization between distinct groups of end users. 
To summarise, this early literature upholds that a two-sided market 
is an economic phenomenon in which two distinct types of users 
enters into a transaction through a platform, and that the numerosity 
of each group creates an externality for the other. All authors, a part 
from Armstrong, focus mostly on positive externalities. Network 
externalities have two practical consequences: the ―chicken-egg 
dilemma‖ and cross-subsidisation.  
Rochet and Tirole (2006) acknowledged that if the analysis stopped 
here, the class of two-sided markets would be overinclusive. Indeed, 
all markets and firms operate on (at least) two sides, and to some 
extent, the proper working and the number of participants of one 
side are beneficial for the other. Therefore, they proposed a much 
more stringent definition: given a platform charging a per-interaction 
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price p1 and p2 to two categories of users6, the market for this 
interaction is two-sided if the total welfare depends on the price 
structure (that is the values of p1 and p2) and not only on the 
aggregate price (that is the sum of p1 and p2). As a corollary, 
transaction costs must prevent the two sides of the market to 
compensate each other, otherwise side-payments would prevent the 
firm from affecting demand through the price structure. 
Still, even this definition tends to overinclusiveness.7 Rochet and 
Tirole were aware of this, and discussed whether even every firm 
could be considered a two-sided market under this definition. They 
considered this not to be the case, ―since at least in competitive 
environments, firms are often de facto one-sided platforms, in that 
there is little ‗wriggle room‘ for them to manipulate the price 
structure‖. This reasoning does not seem very satisfactory, as it 
should then be asked, for example, whether firms in less competitive 
environments should be considered two-sided markets. 
Nevertheless, an aspect of this definition has been so far downplayed 
and would be crucial to draw a clear line among two-sided and other 
markets. Rochet and Tirole considered firms charging a price per 
interaction, and the sum of those prices. In most of the two-sided 
markets they listed there is a single interaction among the two 
groups of users, split in two prongs, whose two prices can be 
summed. Prices, indeed, are not pure numbers. They are expressed 
in currency per quantity of product. You cannot sum the price of a kg 
of butter (€/kg) with the price of one cannon (€/piece); or the price 
for a search (€/query) with the price for advertisement (€/click).   
On the same line, although with a different terminology, Hagiu and 
Wright (2011) consider that the distinguishing feature between two-
sided markets and re-sellers is the existence of a direct interaction 
among the two groups of customers. They also provide a useful 
contribution to systematisation by clarifying that the two groups of 
users must not be distinct, as long as they have different point of 
                                                 
6  Buyers and Sellers in Rochet and Tirole‘s definition. 
7  Rysman (2009) is also aware of overinclusiveness in two-sided markets. Still, he 
is more interested in understanding in which markets two-sidedness is 
important than in a clear demarcation. With this approach, there is the risk to 
come back to the ―you know it when you see it‖ early tendency. 
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interaction with the platform (i.e. the same person may be app 
developer and app consumer on the Apple platform). 
An exemplificative list of two-sided market, the single interaction at 
stake, the class of users and their mirror aims is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1 – Two-sided markets with single interaction 
Platform Interaction User A 
Aim of 
Users A 
User B 
Aim of 
Users B 
Credit Card 
Trade of a 
good 
Consumer 
Buy the 
good 
Merchant 
Have his 
good sold 
Yellow Page 
Finding a 
Business 
Consumer 
Find the 
Business 
Business 
Be found 
by 
consumers 
Stock 
Exchange 
Trade stocks Investor 
Buy the 
stock 
Owner if 
the stock 
Have his 
stock 
bought 
Heterosexual 
Dating Club 
Date Men 
Find a 
woman to 
date 
Woman 
Find a men 
to date 
Operating 
System 
Computer 
tasks 
Consumer 
Perform 
tasks 
Application 
Developer 
Have his 
application 
used for 
tasks 
 
The markets listed above are fully consistent with Rochet and 
Tirole‘s definition. The uniqueness of transaction dispels all doubt 
about whether firms, both in competitive and non-competitive 
environments, are included, as they perform two different 
transactions: they buy work and inputs on one side, and sell 
goods/services to the consumers on the other. 
A consequence stems from the single interaction: in two-sided 
market there are always reciprocal inter-side positive externalities.8 
Since both classes of users want the single interaction to be carried 
out, the higher the numerosity of both sides, the higher the 
possibility for the interaction to take place. This is stated nowhere in 
the literature, but seems a necessary consequence if the reader 
                                                 
8  Network externalities are positive external consumption benefits: a decision to 
consume a good or service provides a benefit to other consumers. Network 
externalities may be intra-side when consumers in one market provide benefit 
to other consumers in the same market; or inter-side, when consumers in one 
market provide benefit to consumers in another related market (Katz and 
Shapiro 1986; Pardolesi and Renda 2002). 
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considers the following example. The numerosity of the classes of 
users is analogous to the liquidity of the market. In every market, 
transactions are facilitated the higher the number of counterparts, 
and two-sided markets make no exception. Reciprocity does not 
imply that externalities from both sides are equivalent: there may 
well be the case that one side creates stronger externalities, and, in 
accordance with the theory, it will be imposed a lower price, or even 
granted a subsidy.9 
The reciprocity of externalities allows clarifying other ―grey areas‖ of 
two-sidedness. For example, supermarkets have been claimed to be 
two-sided markets. They fulfil the single interaction criterion, as the 
interaction would be reconstructed as the trade of products between 
producers and consumers. Still, they do not fulfil the reciprocal inter-
side positive externality criterion. Consumers enjoy inter-side 
externalities due to the variety and availability of products 
(Armstrong 2006). On the contrary, producers do not enjoy inter-side 
externalities due to the number of consumers, as they get utility, i.e. 
money, on the basis of the quantities delivered to the supermarket, 
and not in function of final sales to consumers. If market structures 
with unilateral inter-side externalities were to be considered two-
sided markets, the definition would include all retailers, as the 
analysis for supermarkets applies to any kind of retail shop. Personal 
service providers, such as hospitals, hotels, or beauty farms, would 
also fall in this definition, as consumers receive positive externalities 
from the amount of operators employed by the firm, but operators 
enjoy no externalities based on the number of consumers.10 
Inclusions of these large sectors seems to me exorbitant compared to 
the object of the two-sided literature. Besides, I do not see major 
failures of the economic theory in explaining behaviours of firms, 
                                                 
9  Hagiu and Wright (2011) consider inter-side externalities neither necessary nor 
sufficient, and provide some examples of two-sided markets which would not 
display these externalities. However, these markets are quite marginal and do 
not show inter-side externalities only in some specific occasions. 
10  The single transaction in these cases could be construed as the delivery of e.g. 
health services from professionals to patients, with hospitals as platforms. 
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suppliers and consumers in these markets which need to be 
addressed by an innovative theorisation.11 
If my definition, based on the uniqueness of the transaction and  
reciprocal inter-side externalities were adopted, a class of what are 
currently considered two-sided markets would be excluded: media 
markets12, that is newspapers, televisions, internet portals, and any 
other operator which on one side sells services to consumers, and on 
the other side sells advertising space to advertisers. In media 
markets, inter-side positive network externalities run from the 
number of consumers to advertisers, but, for many medias, they do 
not run from the number of advertisers to the number of 
consumers.13 Furthermore, the two transactions are not the two parts 
of a single interaction: consumers want content, advertisers want 
consumers‘ attention. The common ground between these two 
interactions is that they take place on the same physical space: the 
media support (be it paper, a TV channel or a website). 
Even in the current two-sided market literatures, media markets are 
to a certain extent outliers, because of no or negative inter-side 
externalities from advertisers to users. Other scholars have noticed 
the hiatus between two-sided and media markets. Filistrucchi (2008) 
noticed that the technique to determine the relevant market for 
media operators needs to be different from that applied to other two-
sided markets. He also observed that there is no real interaction 
between the two-sides of a media market, as I try to argue. He and 
his colleague (Filistrucchi et al. 2012) further developed this insight 
by distinguishing between two-sided transaction markets and two-
sided non-transaction markets. The latter category includes media 
markets, whilst the former all other two-sided markets. 
                                                 
11  Hagiu (2007) excludes that retailers are two-sided markets, by distinguishing 
between the merchant mode and the two-sided platform modem, whereas in 
the former case merchants acquire the property of the good.  
12  Audience-makers in Evans‘s (2003) taxonomy. 
13  I had very useful discussions on this issue, and acknowledged that some media 
users enjoy benefits from advertisements (Rosamaria Bitetti kindly suggests 
that the readers of Vanity Fair do). Nevertheless, I retain my point that there is a 
class of media whose users do not enjoy benefits from advertisements, and the 
following analysis applies in primis to them. I will explore in Section 3 how 
most of Google users do not enjoy benefits from advertisements. 
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I would like to approach the conclusion of this section by showing 
the structural consequences of the application of the criteria of the 
single transaction and the reciprocal inter-side externalities. Two-
sided markets with these two features are to be two-sided. Some 
examples can clarify what seems to be only a tautology. There cannot 
be credit card transactions if either buyers or sellers do not take part 
in the platform;14 yellow pages are useless if either readers or 
businesses are missing; the videogame console market does not exist 
if there are not both end consumers and game developers. Both parts 
are necessary, and, rightly because of this necessity, a platform faces 
the ―chicken-and-egg‖ dilemma, which is an ―essential‖ (Evans 
2008a) feature of two-sided analysis. In media markets, the two sides 
are not necessary, they represent a business strategy. Television 
channels are a good example: there are channels whose business 
model is two-sided, that is based on free content and advertising 
revenues, alongside of pay-per-view channels which earn revenues 
from subscription fees. In addition to those, there are public channels 
which are funded out of coercive taxation. No coercive power could 
ever fund a credit card platform if either of the two sides were 
missing.15 Media platforms do not necessarily face the ―chicken-and-
egg‖ dilemma: they need the end users to have advertisers, but not 
viceversa.16 This is a key difference with non-media two-sided 
markets, where, again, platforms need both sides to be operational. 
                                                 
14  Evans (2012) also notices this, albeit in a footnote. On a similar, but less radical, 
line, Rysman (2009) distinguishes between two-sided strategies, where 
platforms have a choice either to go two-sided or not, and structurally-
constrained two-sided markets. 
15  Coercive powers could force users to join the platform, but could not fund it if 
users are not, spontaneously or forcefully, there. 
16  E.g., newspapers are usually considered platforms for which both readers and 
advertisers are necessary to remain in the market. As a counterexample, this has 
not been the case for the Italian newspaper ―Il fatto quotidiano”. Launched in 
2009, he closed the financial year with €29.6 million of revenues and €5.8 
million of profits, whilst revenues from advertising amounted to about 
€850,000. It means that this newspaper covered his costs without resorting to 
the advertising side, although the economic literature usually assumes that 
newspaper makes loss on the readers‘ side to earn extra-revenues on the 
advertisers‘ side. See 
 http://www.italiaoggi.net/news/dettaglio_news.asp?id=201108161129234046
&chkAgenzie=ITALIAOGGI&titolo=Il%20Fatto%20fa%20ricchi%20Padellaro%
20&%20co (last accessed on March 2012). 
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All in all, I propose the following definition of two-sided markets. A 
market operator, called platform, operates in a two-sided market 
when: 
1) a single transaction takes place among two different groups of 
users connected by the platform; 
2) the numerosity of each group of users creates reciprocal inter-
side positive externalities; 
As a consequence of these two requirements, the two sides are 
necessary to the operation of the platform. 
My definition neatly separates two-sided markets from other 
economic structures for which two or more sides are relevant (such 
as firms, supermarkets, providers of personal services, media). Some 
other authors (Hagiu 2009; Hagiu and Wright 2011) propose that 
platforms can be ordered along a continuum, from pure multi-sided 
platform to merchant or re-sellers. In particular, Hagiu and Wright 
(2012) use the share of value created by enabling direct interactions 
among the types of users as the ordering criterion. Once other 
definitional requirements are met, if value is created primarily by 
enabling direct interactions, the firm can be considered a multi-sided 
platform. Therefore, media whose share of revenues is primarily 
obtained from advertising would be two-sided platforms (e.g. 
Vogue), otherwise they would not. Although this contribution is 
very important and clarifies several other definitional issues, I still 
believe that is more useful to consider Google and other media as 
collectors and processor of personal information in order to sell 
targeted ads rather than multi-sided platforms, as it will be discussed 
more in details below. 
Although media markets cannot be represented as two-sided 
markets according to this definition, I do not go as further as to claim 
that they should be treated as normal one-sided markets, since the 
degree of one-way externalities among advertisers and users is an 
important specificity to be taken into account. Another possible 
economic representation of media markets will be proposed in 
Section 4, and, hopefully, it will be useful to interpret Google‘s 
market. The focus is not on discovering whether the Google platform 
is a two-sided market or not, but to create a theoretical economic 
framework which helps a better understanding, especially in terms 
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of antitrust policy. Before doing so, in Section 3 the features of the 
Google platform are analysed, showing why it does not fit in the 
definition of two-sided markets proposed above. 
3 Google’s Market 
As said above in the introduction, most of the economic analyses of 
the Google platform and many antitrust cases against Google are 
based on the two-sided market paradigm, sometimes with several 
caveats (i.a. Devine 2008; Pavel 2009; Cave and Martin 2011; Etro 
2011). Differently, here the Google platform for search and search 
advertising is claimed not to be a two-sided market.  
In this section, the relations among the different actors on these 
markets are analysed, trying to show what the main differences 
between two-sided markets and the Google platform are. Firstly, this 
section shows that two transactions, and not a single one, take place 
on the Google platform; then that operating with two classes of 
users, searchers and advertisers, is a business strategy and not a 
structural feature of the market; and finally that reciprocal cross-side 
network externalities between the two classes of users are absent, or 
at least questionable or negligible. 
On top of its search engine, Google provides other services, which 
are instrumental in establishing its brand and a base of Google users. 
Nevertheless, the Google search engine can be accessed without any 
need to have a Google account for other services, and other services 
can be accessed independently from the use of the Google search 
engine.17  
Focusing on Google operations in the search and search advertising 
markets, business relations can be described as follows (Varian 2007; 
Lastowka 2007; Grimmelmann 2007; Evans 2008b; Pavel 2009; Cave 
and Williams 2011; Etro 2011). Google is a platform on which two 
classes of users operate: searchers and advertisers. 
                                                 
17  In some cases, as discussed below, Google search delivers results from its own 
other services.  
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On the one hand, searchers access Google to submit a query and 
obtain relevant web resources, usually called organic search results. 
To produce search results, Google indexes and crawls the WWW, 
and applies its search algorithms to the content retrieved.18 
Alongside of organic search results, Google may also provide results 
from services which are provided by Google itself (such as maps or 
videos), so-called own-product-placement results. Searchers may 
access Google either directly on its website(s), or indirectly, that is 
through another website or software, such as Google toolbar, search 
bars on browsers, or mobile applications.  
On the other hand, Advertisers buy space for targeted search 
advertisements on Google. Advertisements may be purchased 
directly from the Google-owned advertising platform, Adwords, or 
indirectly via advertising agencies. Advertisers bid for keywords via 
a second-price sealed bid auction. Keywords are a proxy of 
searchers‘ interests, therefore Google ads are considered targeted 
advertising. Based on the advertisers‘ bids, the quality score and the 
reserve price set by Google, paid search results are shown next to or 
above relevant organic search results. Advertisers pay per each click 
that searchers may make on the advertising link (Cost-Per-Click). 
Hence, on Google websites two different transactions take place: 
users want information, advertisers want the attention of users 
which are supposedly interested in their products or services. The 
lack of a single transaction is the first key difference from two-sided 
markets, as defined above. As in media markets, these two 
transactions take place on the same location, that is Google‘s 
websites.  
For Google and any search engine, operations on both search and 
search advertising markets are a winning business strategy, not a 
structural feature (Grimmelmann 2007). Even though in these days 
the Google model seems to be the sole strategy available, from a 
                                                 
18  This interaction between Google and websites can hardly be considered an 
economic transaction as there is not any exchange, only a one-sided retrieval of 
information. Google can freely crawl websites and retrieve contents in 
accordance with the machine-readable limits imposed by website owners (the 
so-called robots). This non-economic interaction is similar e.g. to that between 
map providers and properties/locations; or between restaurant guides and 
restaurants. 
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structural point of view it needs not to be the case. In addition to the 
advertisement-based model, search engines could also get revenues 
from consumers or indexed websites. At the very beginning, Google 
itself was not operating on the market for advertising: its founders 
hoped to get enough revenues by licensing Google search technology 
(Devine 2008).  
As stated above, two-sided markets are characterized by reciprocal 
inter-side network externalities.19 These externalities create the 
―chicken-egg‖ dilemma and the feedback loop between the 
numerosity of the two sides. In some cases, inter-side network 
externalities are reinforced by intra-side network externalities. This is 
the case e.g. for operating systems, where consumers enjoy benefits 
from both the available applications and the users of the system. 
Google‘s markets do not show either reciprocal inter-side or intra-
side network externalities. The lack of reciprocal inter-side 
externalities would suffice to exclude Google from the set of two-
sided markets according to the definition proposed. The lack of intra-
side network externalities is analysed ad abundantiam, because they 
play quite an important role, although maybe misplaced, in the 
economic literature on search engines. 
Advertisers enjoy positive inter-side network externalities 
originating from the number of searchers, as the audience for their 
advertisements increases. They also appreciate that searchers are 
profiled with the highest possible level of precision, as Google does. 
Nevertheless, stating that searchers enjoy benefits originating from 
the number of advertisers is much more questionable. If this were 
not the case, the reciprocity of inter-side network externalities would 
be missing. Let me dwell upon this issue. 
Google searchers look for information, and together with this 
information they are shown advertisements. I claim that in most 
cases these advertisements do not deliver additional benefits to the 
users, as they are not consistent with the aim of the search. Broder 
(2002) proposes the following taxonomies of search queries: 
1. Navigational queries, if the searcher wants to know the location 
of a certain resource on the Internet. E.g., the query ―Wikipedia 
                                                 
19  See footnote 8 above. 
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Italiano‖ may be typed into Google to know the exact URL of 
the Italian edition of Wikipedia; 
2. Informational queries, if the searcher wants to access 
information on a certain issue. E.g., the query ―net neutrality‖ 
may be typed into Google to retrieve a list of websites which 
provide information on this topic; 
3. Transactional query, if the searcher wants to access a website to 
perform a transaction. E.g., the query ―flight Rome-Brussels‖ 
may be typed into Google to find a website selling that flight. 
It may be quite safely assumed that when searchers type a 
transactional query, they enjoy positive externalities from the search 
advertisements. Nevertheless, these queries are estimated to 
represent about 10% of all search queries (Jansen et al. 2008). Besides, 
search ads can cause positive externalities only to the extent to which 
the information is not delivered via the organic search results too.20 
Anecdotally, if the search ―flight Rome-Brussels‖ is performed on 
Google.com, the first and the third paid advertisements correspond 
to the first and the second organic results.21  
More questionable is whether searchers typing informational or 
navigational queries, which represent 90% of all queries,22 enjoy any 
kind of positive externalities from advertisements, or if they are 
indifferent, or if advertisement creates negative externalities. At best, 
this is a set of empirical propositions whose truth needs to be tested 
(Manne and Wright 2011). Some scholars (Evans 2008b; Pavel 2009) 
consider that there is a self-reinforcing loop between the number of 
searchers and advertisers, and therefore conclude that the Google 
platform is best described as a two-sided market. I rather argue that, 
as illustrated above, there are solid theoretical arguments to believe 
that, for most of the queries performed on Google, inter-side positive 
network externalities from advertisers to users are absent or at best 
                                                 
20  ―[S]earch advertising is a partial substitute for search rankings.‖ 
(Grimmelmann, 2007). 
21  Search performed on google.com from an IP located in Brussels on the 27th of 
March 2012. 
22  80% of queries are estimated to be informational, and 10% navigational (Jansen 
et al. 2008). 
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negligible.23 Therefore, the Google platform cannot be considered as 
a two-sided market according to the definition provided in Section 2. 
The lack of intra-side network externalities among the advertisers on 
the Google platform seems not to be an open question. The higher 
the number of advertisers, the more intense the competition for 
advertising space, therefore prices are higher and the salience of an 
advertisement is lower (Manne and Wright 2011). It may be stated 
that the higher the number of advertisers, the more accurate the 
match between advertisements and research queries. But this result 
can be achieved also by advertisers bidding for more accurate 
keywords. 
Google searchers do not enjoy positive intra-side externalities due to 
the numerosity of their class. True, a large number of search users, 
and therefore of search queries, improves the quality of the search 
mechanism. But this is not a network externality. As Katz and 
Shapiro (1986: 824) clearly put it (emphasis original):  
Network Externalities have two fundamental effects [...]. First, the 
relative attractiveness today of rival technologies is influenced by their 
sale history. In effect, they are “demand-side economies of scale” [...]. 
Second, and perhaps more important, in the presence of network 
externalities, a consumer in the market today also cares about the 
future success of the competing product. [...] Network externalities 
share the first type of increasing return to scale with learning by 
doing. The second source of demand-scale economies is, however, 
peculiar to industries with network externalities. 
In the same way, Economides (1986, 2004) describes the network 
externalities effect as the fact that a good is more valuable when the 
expected sales are higher. From the literature, it appears clearly that 
when there is no correlation between consumer utility and future 
numerosity of users, we should not talk of network externalities, but 
only of other kinds of demand-side economies of scale, such as 
learning economies. 
As said, scholars and competitors claim that Google deliver better 
search results because it handles many more search queries and 
many more tail search queries (Grimmelmann 2007; Evans 2008b; 
                                                 
23  On a similar line, see Argenton and Prüfer (2011) who also review several other 
contributions on this issue. 
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Pavel 2009; Cave and Williams 2011). Therefore, Google is able to 
better and more speedily adjust its search results to what users really 
search, and to better perform other tasks such as spelling corrections. 
Nevertheless, today quality of search depends on the number of past 
queries and users; therefore this phenomenon cannot be considered a 
network externality. Indeed, the same happen in the aircraft 
industry, which is the classic illustration for learning economies: 
Boeing and Airbus make better aircrafts at lower costs because have 
made more aircrafts in the past. Economists would never say, and 
have never said so far, that aircraft buyers enjoy network 
externalities; analogously, economists should not say that Google 
searchers do (Manne and Wright 2011). 
In analysing the relationship between number of queries and quality 
of search, Argenton and Prüfer (2011) and Etro (2011) use the term 
(indirect, inter-temporal) network externalities, although they 
acknowledge the difference with ―classical‖ network externalities 
and rather stress the similarities with learning economies. Devine 
(2008) bases the feedback loop on the consideration that additional 
advertisers deliver benefits to searchers because they provide 
additional funds for Google to market better search tools or more 
products. Still, according to such a wide definition, network effects 
and feedback loops could be found in any market in which firms re-
invest their revenues, and this is not the case in the economic 
literature.  
To summarise, this section has shown how Google differs from a 
two-sided market. In particular, two differences are relevant for the 
present analysis:  
1. two transactions with two distinct objects take place on the 
Google platform; 
2. there are no reciprocal inter-side network externalities, because 
the number of advertisers does not create a positive externality 
to searchers, at least for a large set of queries; 
Given these differences, Google operates in two markets – rather 
than in a two-sided market – to pursue its business strategy. 
Therefore, in the next section, I propose a construction of the Google 
platform as a one-sided value chain with Constant Unidirectional 
Network Externalities, in short a CUNE-vertical chain. 
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4 A Construction of Google as a One-Sided Market 
After having proposed a definition of two-sided markets in Section 2 
and analysed in Section 3 why the Google platform does not fit in it, 
the paper now aims at sketching a possible construction of the 
Google platform as a vertical chain. The vertical chain would be 
composed of two one-sided markets, search and advertisements, 
with Constant Unidirectional Network Externalities (CUNE) from 
the number of searchers to advertisers. The goal of this theoretical 
effort is to understand whether changing the underlying economic 
theorisation has an impact on the Google antitrust case. Probably yes, 
as it will be shown in Section 5, 
In this model, the Google platform is a particular kind of retailer, 
buying personal information - which is used to profile users much 
more accurately than most of other medias – and processing it to 
match users and advertisers willing to deliver targeted messages.24 
Google acquires personal information from other intermediaries and 
end users either by monetary payments or providing an in-kind 
payment, that is search results.25 Advertisers make monetary 
payments to Google to be matched with users on the basis of the 
personal information collected.  
To begin with the analysis of the upstream market, I am not the first 
suggesting that search results are actually a price paid by Google to 
end users. Etro (2011) recognises that platforms typically attract 
consumers by ―providing free services that deliver utility for 
consumers and can be seen as a price paid to them‖. As wages are 
the medium for households to buy goods and services in the offline 
world, in the online world search results are necessary to access 
resources online. Whilst in the offline world households supply their 
working force in exchange for wages, in the online world households 
supply their personal information in exchange for search results, 
                                                 
24  The supermarket metaphor should not be intended as if the personal data were 
re-sold to advertisers. Advertisers get access to the users they are interested into 
without directly accessing its personal data. 
25  Again, I leave outside the scope of the analysis all the other services provided 
by Google. Their inclusion in the analysis would not change the outcome, as 
they are not bundled or tied to Google search: users may decide to use Google 
only as a search engine, and not for its other services. 
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allowing Google to perform profiling and matching users and 
advertisements. 
This construction may not be totally convincing at first sight, as we 
are used to think of search services as products demanded by 
consumers for a 0 price. Nevertheless, Google‘s behaviour in the 
market for personal information comes closer to that of a retailer if it 
is considered that it actually pays other websites, and even 
consumers26, for a large chunk of its traffic, as any other firm pays for 
its supplies in the upstream market.  
Focusing on the business relationships between the search engine 
and other IT players, Google acquires search traffic via agreements 
with other websites, software producers or Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs) (Evans 2008b; Pavel 2009; Etro 2011). Minor 
(or former) search engines, such as AOL or ask.com, deliver their 
users‘ queries, and therefore personal information, to Google. Large 
websites sell to search engines the opportunity to include a search 
box in their webpages, and Google has agreements with the bulk of 
most popular websites. In addition to that, OEMs and browsers 
receive substantial revenues from search engines for installing 
dedicated search toolbars. Google, as its main competitor Bing, is 
willing to incur in substantial Traffic Acquisition Costs (TACs) to 
acquire this traffic. TACs usually consist of a fixed fee and a share of 
ads revenues tied to the search queries. For example, in 2011 Google 
entered in an agreement with Mozilla to be the default search engine 
in its Firefox browser search box for $300 million.27 For the last 
financial quarter of 2011, Google TACs totalled $2.45 billion, or 24% 
of total advertising revenues.28 According to its main competitor, 
                                                 
26  Since March, 1st 2012, under the new programme ―Screenwise‖,  Google pays 
up to 25$ per year to end users which allow sending more detailed information 
about their behaviour on the Internet, i.e. which allows to be better profiled. See 
http://www.google.com/landing/screenwisepanel/ (last accessed on 29 
March 2012). 
27  Cf. http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/daily-brief/2011/12/22/google-
to-remain-default-browser-in-mozilla-for-300-milllion-dollars-per-year (last 
accessed on 29 March 2012). 
28  Cf. http://investor.google.com/earnings/2011/Q4_google_earnings.html (last 
accessed on 30th of March 2012) 
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Microsoft, Google receives at least 624 million search queries from its 
partners.29 
To summarise, the Google platform operates in the upper part of the 
value chain by acquiring personal information. A part of the supply 
of personal information is acquired directly from end users and it is 
paid in kind, by providing search services. The remaining part of the 
supply is acquired from ―wholesalers‖, that are large websites, other 
search engines, software producers, especially browsers, and OEMs, 
and it is paid cash, as any production input in any other industry. 
On the downstream market, advertisers can be constructed as buyers 
of targeted ads, aimed at matching products/services and users, 
based on the personal information retrieved upstream. Advertisers‘ 
surplus function of the number of users does not have a point of 
maximum: given a certain price, they aim at accessing as many users 
as possible. Marginal utility of audience, albeit diminishing, is never 
negative. To put it bluntly, advertisers will always prefer reaching 
1,000,000 viewers than 1,000 for the same budget.30 Since the 
marginal cost to reach an additional viewer, that is its price, is 0, 
advertisers' surplus increases indefinitely when the number of users 
increases. Formally, Gossen's second law is verified only for x 
approaching infinity, where is the audience (number of accessed 
users). Gossen's second law states that: 
𝜕𝑈𝑥
𝜕𝑈𝑦
=
𝑝𝑥
𝑝𝑦
 
In our case, x is the audience (number of accessed users) and y is a 
basket representing all other goods. As px=0, for the equation to be 
verified 𝜕𝑈𝑥  is to be equal to 0. Nevertheless, the marginal utility of a 
viewer of an advertisement, as stated above, is never nihil, if not 
approaching the limit to infinity: lim𝑥→∞ 𝜕𝑈𝑥 = 0.  
                                                 
29  Cf. http://www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/2011_JEAN-YVES%20ART.pdf (last 
accessed on 30th of Mach 2012) 
30  Of course, to buy advertising space on media platforms with a certain audience 
advertisers need a minimum budget. The larger the expected audience, the 
higher the budget. But in this Section I keep on focusing only on the Google 
platform and not on media markets in general. The argument would apply also 
to any other media, mutatis mutandis. 
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This phenomenon happens because advertisers do not pay for a 
certain amount of users, but of clicks. Once the Cost per Click (CPC) 
is fixed via the auction mechanism, advertisers would buy as many 
clicks as possible, within their budget, as long as their expected profit 
per click is higher than the price (and 0 clicks otherwise) (Evans 
2008b). This is the reason why advertisers enjoy Constant 
Unidirectional Network Externalities based on the numerosity of the 
audience: the higher the audience, the better. 
With the old economic toolbox, the advertisers‘ demand function for 
audience (Daud) can be constructed as an infinitely elastic demand 
curve. This assumption is common in the literature on the economics 
of advertisement (Spence and Owen 1977; Anderson and Gabszewicz 
2006). Infinite elasticity of the demand for audience is given by the 
fact that the demand of click ―saturates‖ the budget (B) as long as the 
expected profit per click E() is higher than the CPC. The demand 
function for clicks in function of the CPC (Dclick) is sloped downward 
for prices lower than the expected profits (E), and 0 elsewhere.  
In formulas and figures:  
𝐷𝑎𝑢𝑑 (𝐵) = 𝐵  
 𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑘  𝐶𝑃𝐶 =
𝐵 
𝐶𝑃𝐶
          𝐸 𝜋 ≥ 𝐶𝑃𝐶
𝐷𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑘 (𝐶𝑃𝐶) = 0                 𝐸(𝜋) < 𝐶𝑃𝐶
  
 
Figure 7 – Demand curves in Google platform downstream market 
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After the pars destruens, in which I have shown why Google needs 
not to be constructed as a two-sided market, this section provided 
the pars construens of this paper: a construction of the Google 
platform as a CUNE-vertical chain. The next section will be devoted 
to the analysis of the allegations against Google based on this 
theorisation of the platform.  
5 Competition Analysis of Google’s Vertical Chain 
This section deals with the goal of this paper, that is to understand 
what would happen to the Google case if the underlying economic 
analysis were not based upon the two-sided market theory. On the 
basis of the theorisation proposed in the previous Section, I try to 
apply the idea that Google is a retailer of personal information rather 
than a two-sided platform. The aim is to show that if the analysis 
switches from the two-sided model to the CUNE vertical chain 
theory, a clear criterion for the definition of the relevant market can 
be formulated, overcoming the incongruities arisen so far. As a 
consequence, however, we need to give up a product-based market 
definition, i.e. based upon the services provided (ads and searches), 
to adopt an approach which considers that Google‘s market is based 
upon the personal information collected. Besides, it will be hopefully 
clarified which Google conducts can be constructed as alleged 
violations of competition rules.  
This section cannot be considered definitive, as the major antitrust 
case so far, initiated by the European Commission, is still ongoing 
and the statement of objections, i.e. the detailed allegations against 
Google, have not yet been made public. A more thorough analysis of 
the Google case from the point of view of EU competition will be the 
object of a future research, but here I want to make clear if and how 
the alleged abuses of dominant position can be constructed over a 
vertical value chain. 
Definition of the Relevant Market 
In my construction, Google operates in the relevant market for users‘ 
personal information. As it was already suggested, the market 
definition is no longer product-based and consequently does not 
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depend on the features of the service sold by Google, that is search 
results and ads. It means that I no longer propose to classify the 
market for ads based upon the media-type, that is offline or online 
media, or the online advertising delivery model, that is display, 
search and classified ads. On the contrary, what is relevant to draw 
the boundaries between the markets is the degree of user profiling.  
So far, economic literature and the case law have considered the 
market for online advertisements as distinguished from the market 
for offline advertisements in most cases (Pavel 2009; Ratliff and 
Rubinfeld 2010; Etro 2011; Van Loon 2012).31 In my interpretation, 
this amounts to say that the level of profiling in online advertising is 
so much higher that online and offline ads are not substitutable from 
the point of view of advertisers.32  
The open question is whether the level of profiling is also different 
enough between search advertisements on the one hand and other 
kinds of online advertisements on the other. So far the European 
Commission could escape taking any stance on this issue.33 On the 
contrary, the French Competition Authority identified a separate 
relevant market for search advertising in an opinion on the Google 
operations.34 The construction here proposed suggests assessing 
whether, from a theoretical and empirical point of view, the personal 
information collected by search engines allows for a level of profiling 
similar or different compared to ads sold by other internet websites.  
If the level of profiling - that is, the amount of personal information 
collected - is the criterion to define the relevant market, it becomes 
clear that Google‘s competitors are not only other search engines.  On 
the contrary, other intermediaries of personal information would be 
part of the same relevant market. Even though a proper market 
definition would need an empirical test, it is already possible to 
reasonably state that at least two other classes of operators compete 
                                                 
31  Cf. European Commission Decision of 11/03/2008 Case No COMP/M.4731 – 
Google/DoubleClick, §§45-48; Decision Microsoft/ Yahoo! supra note 2. 
32  Cf. Cave and Williams 2011. 
33  Cf. note 31 above. 
34  Autorité de la Concurrence, Opinion No 10-A-29 of 14 December 2010 on the 
competitive operation of online advertising 
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on this market: social networks and email providers. Both classes of 
intermediaries collect a large amount of users‘ personal information, 
as search engines do, and use it to deliver targeted ads on the same 
page in which their services are delivered. Other websites which 
require registration to keep track of users‘ behaviours and deliver 
ads on the basis of this information could also be part of this relevant 
market if the level of profiling were similar. In addition to those, it 
should also be considered that the level of profiling in display 
advertising is becoming higher, and therefore the profiling gap is 
becoming closer, possibly leading this form of advertisement to be 
included in this market.35 
From the CUNE model it emerges clearly why Google is competing 
e.g. with Facebook, something which was already suggested by some 
authors (Devine 2008; Alexandrov et al. 2011; Renda 2011), but, most 
of all, appears clearly from the strategies of the two companies. 
Clearer than any reasoning is The Economist‘s cover on December, 
1st 2012 reproduced at the beginning of this article. Indeed, 
advertisers want to deliver granular targeted ads based on a large 
amount of personal information and are likely to consider both 
Google and Facebook as competing platform. From the point of view 
of supply substitution, it is worth noting that Google entered the 
social network market with Google+, and that Microsoft‘s Bing 
entered into an agreement to supply search services on Facebook.  
Rather than only on search queries or search-based advertisements, 
the dominance of Google has to be assessed in relation to this 
additional class of competitors, and market shares are going to be 
lower.  Based on Commission decisions, the definition of the relevant 
markets will be likely done along national or linguistic borders. In 
addition to that, detailed information on the share of revenues from 
high-profiled advertising will need to be retrieved from firms and is 
not publicly available. Whether Google will be dominant in this 
market is still an open question: many other players will be included, 
but Google will likely dwarf their advertising revenues. Only as a 
matter of comparison, in 2011 Google advertising revenues amount 
                                                 
35  As argued by the European Commission in the Google/DoubleClick Decision, 
§§11.-13 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
Antitrust and Regulation in the EU  
Is the Google Platform a Two-Sided Market? 
 
Tesi di dottorato di Giacomo Luchetta, discussa presso  
l‘Università LUISS Guido Carli, soggetta a Licenza Creative  
Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere derivate 3.0 
to $36.5 billion, whilst Facebook advertising revenues to $3.2 
billion.36 
It is worth noting that one of the sides of the ―former‖ two-sided 
market, that is the market for search, can no longer be construed as a 
market in which Google sells its services, as it becomes the input 
market in which end users and large intermediaries supply personal 
information to Google. As it will be shown below, this does not 
imply that Google‘s conduct on this market is not relevant from a 
completion law perspective, but the analysis becomes radically 
different. Countervailing buyer power, sometimes an UFO in 
antitrust analyses, must come into play. 
Exclusive Agreements for Traffic Acquisitions 
Google has been accused37 to have ―entered into exclusive 
syndication agreements with certain high-traffic online publishers, 
foreclosing access by competitors‖ (Manne and Wright 2011). In my 
model, these are not exclusive distribution agreements for search 
services, but exclusive purchasing agreements for users‘ personal 
information, large websites, software producers and OEMs being the 
suppliers and Google the retailer.  
At first glance several specific abuses could be at least in theory 
imputed to Google:  
1. raising rivals‘ costs, by preventing them to achieve the efficient 
scale; 
2. exclusive dealing in force of the exclusivity clause (and here the 
duration of the contract and the analysis of the barriers to entry 
in the supply market would be crucial); 
3. predatory pricing or, conversely, predatory bidding, if Google 
offered such a high price to acquire traffic that other as-efficient 
competitors could not replicate its bid. 
These agreements allegedly have a foreclosing effect, and possibly 
also foreclosing intent, because they deprive competitors from 
                                                 
36  Google financial statement for 2011; Facebook Prospectus for the Initial Public 
Offering. 
37  TradeComet.Com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 
09Civ.1400(SHS)) 
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accessing inputs and reaching an efficient scale (Evans 2008b; Pavel 
2009). Although the concept of dominant position may be applied 
also to the buyer‘s – other than the supplier‘s – position, the case law 
in this field is quite limited. The relevant U.S. Supreme Court case is 
Weyerhaeuser,38 whilst, to my knowledge, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union never dealt with a buyer‘s dominance case. 
In the Weyerhauser case, the Supreme Court stressed the similarities 
between predatory pricing and bidding, although acknowledging 
that the latter present lower risks for end-consumers. Therefore, the 
predatory pricing test needs to be applied. The test has two prongs: 
in the first prong, the plaintiff needs to prove that predatory bidding 
raised costs so much that the firm is operating at a loss. In the second 
prongs, the plaintiff needs to prove that there is a dangerous 
probability of recouping. 
Commentators raised two main issues concerning this judgment. 
First of all, unlike predatory pricing, predatory bidding presents a 
lower risk of chilling price competition, and therefore the test should 
be not as strict. Secondly, prohibition of predatory bidding allegedly 
protects competitors and suppliers rather than consumers, which 
may not be hurt by the conduct. This would be especially true if the 
dominant buyer did not enjoy downstream market power (Kirkwood 
2005; Salop 2005; Noll 2005; Zerbe 2005; Levin 2007; Rosch 2007; 
Werden 2007).  
Although there are no precedents, I claim that predatory bidding 
would be sanctioned under EU Competition Law. First of all, EU 
Competition law is more severe against predatory pricing, whereas 
there is no need to prove the probability (let alone a dangerous 
probability) of recouping when the price is lower than the average 
variable costs. Secondly, protection of the competitive process as a 
whole, and thereby of competitors, is less of a hectic debate on this 
side of Atlantic. 
Nevertheless, if the market is constructed as a CUNE-vertical chain, 
it may be simpler to resort to the category of vertical agreements of 
exclusive distributions than to involve an analysis of a firm dominant 
                                                 
38 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. - 05-381 (2007), 
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on the buyer side.39 Since under the EU law, after the recent reform, 
both supplier‘s and buyer‘s market power has become relevant, as 
long as Google‘s share in the market for users' personal information 
is higher than 30%, and there are strong indications that this is the 
case, these agreements would not be covered by the block 
exemption40 provided by Regulation 330/2010.41 Importantly, it 
would be no longer relevant to demonstrate that Google holds a 
dominant position. Google would be barred from entering into these 
agreements if their anti-competitive effects were proved by the 
European Commission, and if the defendant could not justify them 
in terms of efficiency under the four cumulative conditions set out in 
art. 101.3 TFEU. 
Manipulation of Search Results 
Google has been allegedly manipulating its search results (Manne 
and Wright 2011; Cave and Williams 2011; Balto 2011; Van Loon 
2012) with two aims: promoting its own-produced content; and 
demoting its competitors‘ content, especially in the case of vertical 
search engines. 
This seems to me the most difficult allegation to be framed as an 
antitrust violation. First of all, it is difficult to distinguish biased 
search from unbiased (or low-quality) results. Secondly, Google has 
its own good reasons to modify its search algorithms to prevent 
frauds, and it would be very difficult to distinguish ―good‖ from 
―bad‖ manipulation (Grimmelmann 2007; Balto 2012).  
Beyond a difficult probation, the most important issue is whether 
inclusion of certain websites in the search results creates an economic 
or legal relation between the search engine and the website, or not. I 
am inclined to consider it not to be the case, and to stress the content 
                                                 
39  ―In an exclusive distribution agreement, the supplier agrees to sell its products 
to only one distributor for resale‖ (Commision 2010). 
40  The application of the block exemption would also be prevented by the 
inclusion of any of the so-called hardcore restrictions (Commission 2010). 
41  Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application 
of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices. OJ L 102, 23.4.2010, p. 
1–7 
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(informational) aspect of this relation (Urso 2011). The content-
informational aspect is so prevalent that in the US the doctrine of free 
speech has even been invoked to defend the freedom to provide 
subjective search results (Grimmelmann 2007). Besides, the FTC 
actually privileged this aspect when initiating an investigation on 
search manipulation practices on the basis of Section 5 of the FTC act, 
which forbids unfair and deceptive competition, and not of the 
Sherman Act (Renda 2012).  
Considering Google as a retailer of personal information excludes the 
construction of a relevant market in which it sells search results, and 
therefore helps in clarifying why this conduct can hardly be 
considered a violation of any antitrust rule. To draw an analogy, in 
other media markets Competition Authorities cannot probe TV 
channels for the content provided to viewers, as much as it would be 
very difficult for a restaurant owner to claim antitrust violations in 
case he feels defrauded by the non-inclusion or the bad review 
published in a guide. Possibly, these allegations could fall under the 
prohibition of unfair competition rather than under antitrust law.  
The controversy of applying competition law to search results 
appears clearly from a recent French judgment.42 Google was 
accused of abusing its dominant position in the search market by 
leveraging into the online map service market, where it offered 
Google Maps at a 0 price, therefore eradicating competitors via 
predatory prices. The Court confirmed the accusation and imposed a 
fine of €500,000 on Google. The judgment is at best controversial, 
especially in the definition of the relevant markets. In particular, the 
judgment only defines linked markets, ―marches connexes‖, never 
clarifying what is the rather convoluted relationship between the 
market in which Google is dominant and the market in which the 
alleged abuse takes place. It does not refer to two-sided market 
analysis, nor to any other economic model (Pardolesi and Urso 2012; 
Fleischer and Smith 2012). 
There is no need to resort to the two-sided market toolbox to support 
the legitimacy of this Google conduct. The CUNE model excludes the 
                                                 
42  Tribunal de Commerce De Paris - 15ème Chambre (31/1/2012). Société Bottin 
Cartographes c. Société Google France e Société Google, Inc. 
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relevance of the content of search results for competition law. Search 
results are not anymore the object traded in a relevant market, but 
constitute the in-kind payment for end users in exchange for 
personal information. If searchers could trade their personal 
information with another search engine which delivered a higher 
utility (i.e. a higher and non-biased search quality), they would have 
every incentive to do so, as much as workers can leave a firm if it 
offers lower wages than its competitors.  
It has already been stressed that Google is not Microsoft: it cannot 
rely on network externalities, both intra- and inter-side, to lock in 
consumers, and this ensures a better alignment of Google‘s and 
consumers incentives. For this reason, Google has strong incentives 
not to dilute the quality of its search results - at least to a certain 
extent - because users could migrate, therefore shrinking ads 
revenues (Balto 2012). Finally, I tend to consider search results as 
experience rather than credence goods (unlike Pavel 2009), since 
searchers can check whether the links provided take to the 
information/transaction they were looking for. Therefore, searchers 
can assess the quality of search results when deciding in which 
search engine they input their next query. 
That said, I am aware that search engines are nowadays the gateway 
to the Internet. Websites ―do not exist‖ if they are not indexed by 
search engines. I am also aware that Google in this moment holds the 
key of this gateway, and that no competitor seems to threaten its 
position in the medium term. Therefore, there may be more than 
solid ground to require some form of ―search neutrality‖ and the 
prohibition to promote or demote certain content for illegitimate 
reasons. In addition to strong economic considerations, other values 
such as plurality in the Internet are at stake here. Nevertheless, I 
would suggest that these practices call for sectoral regulation rather 
than antitrust law. I am also aware that the technical limitations may 
render such a regulation impracticable. 
Allegations in the downstream market 
Google has been accused to i) restrict data portability for advertisers 
between different advertising platforms; ii) lower the quality score / 
increase the reserve price for competitors, therefore increasing their 
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CPC (Manne and Wright 2011; Cave and Williams 2011; Balto 2011; 
Van Loon 2012). 
Assuming that Google has a dominant position in the market for 
personal information, restrictions of data portability is a restriction to 
interoperability. If strong enough, these restrictions could lead to 
integrate an exclusivity clause, and therefore exclusive dealing. At 
first glance, I feel that authorities will have a long way to go to 
demonstrate unlawfulness, and that these restrictions need to be very 
severe to integrate an abusive behaviour, but I defer to further 
research on this issue as soon as the allegations become public. 
As for manipulation of quality score/reserve price for advertising 
competitors, this fact can be constructed as a discrimination: Google 
would be applying different prices for its search advertisements 
depending on whether a customer is a competitor or not. The 
difficulty here would be to prove the abuse, since discrimination, as 
other exploitative abuses, often falls in a grey area between 
legitimate subjective decisions on the price, which is the key variable 
from which competition authorities usually voluntarily abstain, and 
anticompetitive behaviours (Frignani and Pardolesi  2006; Osti 2007). 
Grey is even greyer for search engines, as it would be incredibly 
difficult to tell whether a line of code of the algorithm is 
discriminatory or it is just enhancing the quality of search. The task 
of Competition Authorities in proving the abuse would be much 
easier if Google refused access to its advertising platform to its 
competitors, or asked for a price so high which could amount to a 
refusal. Nevertheless, this seems not to be the case. Again, I defer to 
further research on this issue as soon as the allegations become 
public. 
Degradations of Access to Owned Content  
In its complaint, Microsoft accused Google to degrade Bing‘s access 
to YouTube.43 Although the technicalities of the allegations are not 
                                                 
43  Cf. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8423490/Why-Microsoft-
filed-a-formal-complaint-about-Google-and-the-search-giants-reponse.html 
(last accessed on 30th March 2012)  
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yet known, a quick check of YouTube‘s Robots.txt file shows that the 
Google search engine has a larger access to YouTube‘s resources.44 
This is the only allegation which is independent on whether the 
Google platform is considered a two-sided market or a CUNE-
vertical chain, as it is factually perpetrated by another entity, 
YouTube, a video website owned by Google since 2006. It is 
impossible to know whether this degradation amounts to a full 
refusal to deal, i.e. is severe enough to prevent Bing to de facto index 
YouTube‘s content. If this were not the case, this practice would still 
amount to raising rival‘s costs. It could be the case that YouTube is 
considered as an essential facility, given that it is one of the most 
visited websites (Tarantino 2011). Differently from the other 
conducts, it is difficult to see in this case any legitimate business 
justification for such behaviour: by degrading indexation, YouTube, 
and therefore Google which owns it, is intentionally losing traffic 
without any direct benefit. 
6 Conclusions 
Convincing the reader that Google, and therefore any media market, 
is not a two-sided market is a vaste programme, as general de Gaulle 
would say. Having the reader making an additional step, that is 
considering Google as a retailer of personal information rather than a 
media platform, seems even harder. It would be indeed necessary to 
give up the mainstream opinion, supported both by scholars and 
competition authorities, and the two-sided market toolbox. 
Nevertheless, I hope to have instilled a sprinkle of doubt in the 
readers, by showing what are the reasons to come along this way, 
and the benefits brought by this theorisation in terms of a better 
understanding and explanation of firms‘ behaviours and, 
consequently, of the antitrust allegations. 
                                                 
44  Robots.txt files are machine-readable files which make known to search engine 
crawlers which parts of the website are indexable and which are not. All 
websites use robots.txt instruction, and it is free to decide which part of the 
website can be indexed by which search engine. Cf. 
www.youtube.com/robots.txt (last accessed on 30th March 2012). 
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Firstly, it has been that the economic literature on two-sided markets 
has not yet drawn clear boundaries between what is a two-sided 
market and what is not. The current definition, as many scholars 
already claimed, tends to over-inclusiveness, and to apply two-sided 
logic to one-sided markets. For this reason, I propose a new 
definition on what is a two-sided market, relying on two criteria: i) 
the uniqueness of the transaction among two distinct groups of 
users; ii) the reciprocal flow of inter-side positive network 
externalities. This definition leaves out media markets, which, as 
other scholars had already realised, are sui generis (non-transaction) 
two-sided markets.  
Then, I have analysed how the Google platform does not possess the 
features of a canonical two-sided market. Under the definition 
proposed, the Google platform is not a two-sided market because: i) 
two transactions take place on the Google platform, that is searchers 
demanding search results and advertisers demanding access to well-
profiled users; ii) externalities flow only from the numerosity of 
searchers to advertisers, and not the other way round. 
That said, I realise that the Google platform has its own peculiarities, 
in particular the Constant Unidirectional Network Externalities 
which run from the numerosity of the searchers to advertisers. 
Therefore, I propose a theorisation in which Google is considered as 
the pivotal element of a CUNE-value chain. The platform buys 
personal information from end users and other IT industry players, 
and process it to match ads and users. Search results are the in-kind 
payment which Google provides to its suppliers (together with 
monetary payments for large ―wholesalers‖). Constant 
Unidirectional Network Externalities can be modelled as the 
advertisers having an infinitely elastic demand for audience, which is 
actually what happens in the online advertising industry. 
I used this model to analyse the allegations against Google. To a 
certain extent, considering the Google platform as a CUNE-value 
chain rather than a two-sided market has deep implications on the 
antitrust analysis. First of all, the dominance of Google in the market 
for personal information should be assessed against other 
competitors, such as social networks. Indeed, social networks do 
what Google does: get users‘ personal information and monetise it 
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via advertisements. If we keep our focus on the markets for search 
and search advertisement, which are the two sides of the Google 
platform, we could miss this competitive relationship. 
Then, most of the competition allegations can be constructed 
differently than in a two-sided market. The section devoted to the 
antitrust analysis is only a long sketch, as more in-depth and target 
research would be needed, ideally if and when the European 
Commission issues its Statement of Objections. Nevertheless, it is 
already possible to see that, at least in one case (traffic acquisition 
agreements), the vertical chain theorisation allows to verify the 
lawfulness of the conduct without having to demonstrate Google‘s 
dominance. As for search manipulation, the new theoretical 
framework explains why certain conducts would need specific 
regulation rather than antitrust enforcement. 
This paper was born out of the feeling that the literature on two-
sided markets was not the proper tool to analyse the Google case. 
Therefore, I tried to leave the old road to see the Google case from 
another perspective. Without claiming for the exhaustiveness or 
absoluteness of this perspective, I hope that it can help to better 
understand the peculiarities of the Google platform and to push a bit 
forward the daunting task that Competition Authorities across the 
world are and will be facing in disentangling this dilemma.  
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THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
INTERMEDIARIES OF PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 
Giacomo Luchetta* 
Abstract 
This paper explores a class of firms: the intermediaries of personal 
information. In the economics of personal information, scarcity is no 
longer the only, and foremost, determinant of value. The most 
important determinant of value becomes connection. Adapting what 
Gervais (2012) claims to be the first law of an information-flooded 
cloud-modelled economy, value is not derived from scarcity but 
rather from the fact that those who value it most will find it. Personal 
information is the raw material to create connections. Intermediaries 
collect personal information in exchange for goods or services, 
regardless of whether they actually need that information to perform 
their main activity, and use this information to connect other goods 
and services with the users who value them most, e.g. via 
personalisation or targeted advertising. Many firms in many 
different sectors are, or could become, intermediaries of personal 
information, from Google to supermarkets, from telecom operators 
to insurance companies. 
The descriptive analysis of this industry has consequences in terms 
of business model and regulatory approach. As for the former, it is 
worth exploring the conditions for which a firm could profitably 
become an intermediary of personal information and thereby exploit 
untapped resources for revenue generation. As for the latter, an 
imperfect understanding of the economics of personal information 
creates the risk for misaligned norms, and therefore for an uneven 
competition.
                                                 
*  This article has been presented at the SIDE-ISLE (Italian Society of Law and 
Economics) 8th Annual Conference, University of Roma Tre, 13/15 December 
2012. It has also been accepted at ―The Power of Information‖ Conference, 
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 This article greatly benefited from the discussion with Prof. Claudio Feijoo and 
from comments of Prof. Kristina Irion and Bernardo Rangoni. I also thank the 
participants to the CEPS Digital Forum Task Force on Online Data Processing in 
the Context of the EU Data Protection Reform for discussing some of the issues 
raised in this article. 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Tesi di dottorato di Giacomo Luchetta, discussa presso  
l‘Università LUISS Guido Carli, soggetta a Licenza Creative  
Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere derivate 3.0 
Antitrust and Regulation in the EU  
The Law and Economics of Intermediaries of Personal Information 
 
1 Introduction 
I was writing a chapter of my PhD thesis on Google business model 
when I received a not-so-longed-for letter at home, letting me know 
that my car insurance was about to expire. So I went to my insurance 
dealer to hear the ominous amount that I was due to pay. I weakly 
resisted the quasi-robbery by renouncing to some benefits, and 
eventually accepted the final deal.  Once agreed on the conditions, I 
had to deliver (or re-confirm) a bulk of personal information to 
finalise the contract. The reader will be surely familiar with that. Sex, 
age, place of residence, domicile, brand and model of car, 
equipments, mileage so far, expected mileage per year and so on and 
so forth. Then, of course, my insurance company knows even more 
about me. From my event history, it knows that I use my car both in 
Brussels and Italy. It knows that I am not a mechanical guy, as I call 
for the insurance assistance whenever I have a problem, at least 
when I am not around my hometown. It knows that I am willing to 
resort to legal actions if needed, as I sued a Belgian insurance for 
refusing to pay damages.  Not all this information is strictly 
necessary for the insurance company. It is used to pool and segregate 
risks, to match the right premium to my risk profile and my event 
history. This data allows the insurance company to do a better, more 
tailored and more efficient job.  
My insurance company, I realised, is sitting on a mine of personal 
information which is not fully monetised. That‘s a pity, as this could 
be another source of revenues which in turn could maybe, very 
maybe, lower the price of my car policy. An insurance company 
could sell targeted ads for mechanic shops, and I would actually 
appreciate to have a hint about where to go in Brussels in case of 
problems. It could sell targeted ads for car dealers, knowing which 
cars I drove so far, my equipments, my mileage and so on and so 
forth. It could sell targeted ads for insurance-specialised lawyers.1 
                                                 
1  This paper deals with ―positive matching‖ between users and goods or services. 
I am aware that the same information could be used to my detriment. E.g., it 
could be communicated to the Belgian government for registration and tax 
purposes; or to other insurance companies to raise my premium because I am a 
legal troublemaker. Still, the focus of this paper is in exploiting matches that 
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After signing the check, I went home and texted my girlfriend about 
how much I had to pay, the lack of any meaningful competition in 
the Italian insurance market, tax increase and so on. My telephone 
company, had it accessed my SMS, would have acquired a valuable 
information, which could have used to sell targeted ads to other 
insurance companies. Had I written an email through my Gmail 
account rather than an SMS, Google would have accessed that 
information and actually used to deliver targeted ads. Why such a 
different use of personal information across companies? Is it only a 
business model choice? Or are companies in different sectors 
regulated differently from the point of view of use of personal 
information? And which companies are better suited, from a 
business and regulatory perspective, to profit from personal 
information, and why? 
Begging the reader‘s pardon for such a digressive introduction, I 
would like now to provide a more formal map to the structure of the 
paper. The independent variable of this research is the 
intermediation of personal information. It is claimed that 
externalities and irrational choice patterns in the ―market for 
privacy‖ may justify the economic regulation of the intermediation of 
personal information. The market for privacy is organised along 
vertical value chains in which intermediaries of personal information 
play the pivotal role. The intermediaries operate as retailers of 
personal information, buying information from users and employing 
it to match the same users with goods and services. To compare units 
which are similar from the point of view of how they intermediate 
personal information, a taxonomy along five dimensions is 
introduced. Once the ―left side‖ of the logical relation is set, the 
economic regulation of personal information and privacy, the 
dependent variable, is brought under the spotlight. This paper aims 
at answering whether the economic regulation of personal 
information and privacy is currently treating similar companies in a 
consistent way or not. I claim that both privacy regulation and 
                                                                                                                            
create value. How to counter the risk of detrimental matching is a topic worth 
the same, if not more, attention, but which would take me out of the current 
research. Having an agnostic stance, in this paper I never intend to argue for a 
laxer or stricter regulation of personal information, only for a more consistent 
one. 
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competition policy currently neglect the intermediaries of personal 
information as such, and thereby fail to provide a level playing-field. 
The same investigation is applied to cloud computing providers, to 
verify whether the current EU legal framework allows them to 
become, as predicted, the new class of ―dominant‖ intermediaries.  
As shortly sketched above, intermediaries of personal information 
harvest personal information from users and monetise this 
information matching users with their own or third-party goods and 
services. Matching, also called ―behavioural targeting‖ in the online 
ecosystem (ENISA 2012), takes place e.g. through personalisation, 
recommendations (Linden et al. 2003), targeted advertising (OFT 
2010), or dedicated deals. Many firms in many different sectors are 
intermediaries of personal information. The king is obviously Google 
with its portfolio of services. Facebook and any social networks are 
major players too. But many other firms are or at least could be 
intermediaries of personal information: online sellers, supermarkets 
offering loyalty programmes, email providers, airlines with or 
without offering fidelity cards, telecom operators, media companies, 
financial institutions and insurance companies. They all collect, track, 
harvest personal information and generate value out of it through 
matching consumers and producers. 
Raising revenues through matching users and consumers is neither 
revolutionary nor the only commercial reason to exploit personal 
information. It has been claimed that firms would have exploited 
personal information for price discrimination (Odlyzko 2003), 
although this possibility has not materialised so far. For the future, 
another promising avenue of exploitation seems to be predictive 
analytics.2 Other uses include e-commerce safety, or enhanced 
business processes (Acquisti 2010; BCG 2012). Nevertheless, so far 
matching, especially through targeted ads, is the most widespread 
way to monetise personal information, and this will be the focus of 
this paper. 
 
                                                 
2  For a panoramic view of this issue, cf. 
ftp://129.35.224.15/software/kr/data/pdf/forpred.pdf (last accessed on 
December 2012). 
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In the current socio-technical environment, matching has become of 
paramount importance. For intermediaries of personal information, 
scarcity is no longer the only, or most important, determinant of 
value. Rather, connection is. Adapting what Gervais (2012) claims to 
be the first law of an information-flooded cloud-modelled economy, 
value is not derived from scarcity but rather from the fact that those who 
value it most will find it. If this holds, prices, the Hayekian transmitter 
of information about scarcity, no longer suffice. Connections crate 
value and personal information is the raw material to create 
connections. 
To be successful, it is no longer necessary for a mechanical shop to be 
the only one in town able to fix Volkswagen Golfs. The succession of 
Kondratiev waves made scarcity much less relevant than before. For 
three centuries space has been undergoing progressive 
miniaturisation; for at least a century industrial standardization has 
been becoming the norm; and for the last two decades Internet has 
been spawning an incredible amount of information, information 
which can be processed via ubiquitous computers. Uniqueness or 
scarcity became close to impossible for a vast range of product and 
services.3 Rather than upon scarcity, value can be created connecting 
producers with users, e.g. by letting know all possessors of a Golf 
that there is a specialized technician nearby.  To do so, the technician 
needs to know who the possessors of a Volkswagen Golf in town are. 
Personal information creates connections. 
Intermediaries are the key actors in the economy of personal 
information, rightly because they have the capacity to create 
connectivity (Picker 2009, Gervais 2012). Intermediaries collect 
personal information in exchange for a good or service, regardless of 
whether they actually need that information to perform their main 
activity, and use this information to connect other goods and services 
with the users who value them most. The connection can take 
different shapes: it can be Amazon suggestions, Groupon daily mails 
or Google‘s targeted ads.  
                                                 
3  Interestingly, in the developing economies, where these three factors have not 
played the same prominent role, the importance of scarcity would be higher. 
Being the only mechanic shop in Lusaka able to repair a Volkswagen Golf and 
possessing the specific spare parts does create value. 
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Intermediaries are worth exploring on two levels of analysis: their 
business model and the economic regulation to which they are 
subject. As for business model analysis, personal information 
economics is a possible theory for firm behaviours, and consequently 
for business strategies (mainly in the online sector, but also for brick 
and mortar companies). Scarcity and price still lead the markets in 
many sectors. Scarcity, or uniqueness, push consumers to pay a 
premium for certain products/services/brands, as Apple masterly 
does. And many companies conquer market shares through a low-
price strategy, Ryanair or H&M to name a couple. Still, personal 
information-based firms are playing a bigger and bigger role in our 
economy, and it is therefore a territory worth exploring. Most 
importantly, it is worth exploring the conditions for which a firm 
could profitably become an intermediary of personal information 
and thereby exploit untapped resources for revenue generation. 
Indeed, one of the most successful low-cost companies, Ryanair, 
raises revenues also by matching customers with car rentals, suitcase 
manufacturers, and hotels. 
Then, from a law and economics perspective, it is worth exploring 
the implications for economic regulation. I would claim that an 
imperfect understanding of the economics of personal information 
creates the risk for misaligned norms. In particular, I fear that 
different categories of intermediates currently face different 
regulatory frameworks, because norms are devised over other 
parameters. For example, a telecom operator may face more 
difficulties in accessing its customers‘ communication compared to 
Google, although in both cases they are trying to access the same 
kind of information with similar methods. Besides, as far as 
competition policy is concerned, ―an uneven playing field – allowing 
one firm to use the information that it sees while blocking others 
from doing the same thing – crates market power through limiting 
competition‖ (Picker 2008).  
Finally, one Section is devoted to those which are predicted to be the 
most important intermediaries of the near future: providers of cloud 
computing. As Picker (2008, 2009) put clearly, cloud providers are 
the ―new web intermediaries at the heart of Web 2.0 hav[ing] access 
to an enormous datastream about their users.‖ Although I embrace 
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most of his seminal analysis, ads-based model is not the only, and for 
some services not the dominant, business model for cloud 
computing. A closer look to these intermediaries will be a ground for 
applying the theoretical framework reviewed and constructed earlier 
in this article. 
Before the usual scrolling of the paper chapter-by-chapter, I would 
like to clarify a last point. First, this is a positive-science descriptive 
paper. No normative judgments on whether more and deeper 
harvesting and processing of personal information is or is not 
desirable should be inferred. I personally have a mixed opinion on 
that. This position may seem unrealistic, but it is necessary to this 
first attempt to provide an analysis of this class of firms. Of course, 
further research will need to relax this assumption, as usual, and 
integrate the dark side of targeted ads. In any case, the assessment of 
the consequences due to the unprecedented use of personal 
information in the age of computer networks deserves much deeper 
reflections, such as Lessig‘s (2006) or Kang‘s (1998), than my quick 
walk through existing and possible business models and regulations 
of intermediaries of personal information. 
And now the usual scrolling. Section 2 deals with the 
microeconomics of personal information. First, the behaviour of 
consumers in the ―market for privacy‖, i.e. consumers‘ choices over 
privacy attributes, is reviewed. Then, the market for intermediation 
of personal information is described as a value chain in which 
intermediaries operate as retailers of personal information, buying 
information from users and employing it to match the same users 
with goods and services. Section 3 provides a taxonomy of 
intermediaries along five dimensions. In Section 4 two example of 
economic regulation of intermediaries of personal information are 
discussed: whether the regulation of privacy and competition policy 
in the EU creates a level playing-field. Section 5 assesses the same 
question with respect to the EU legal privacy legal framework for 
cloud computing providers. Section 6 briefly concludes. 
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2 Microeconomics of Personal Information 
In this section, the microeconomics of personal information will be 
explored in some details. Firstly, by reviewing the existing stream of 
literature, I will discuss how individual decision-makers behave 
when confronted with choices about disclosure of personal data. It 
will be shown that individuals are quite erratic in matching 
preferences and behaviours with respect to personal information. 
The inconsistencies reported have consequences in terms of the 
economic analysis of different policies. Then, the market for personal 
information, i.e. the theoretical framework in which intermediaries 
operate by collecting and selling information, will be analysed. I try 
to conceptualise this market without resorting to a two-sided 
structure, analogously but what I did to define the relevant market of 
a specific intermediary, Google (Luchetta 2012). 
2.1 The Consumer-Side: Personal Information Decision-Making 
The economics of privacy analyses the behaviour of individual 
decision-makers when choosing whether to disclose or not personal 
information, and its policy implications.  
First, some definitional fuss is required. Privacy is a 
multidimensional, as privacy protects different aspects of life. 
Hirshleifer‘s (1980) economic analysis contends that privacy can be 
split into three elements: secrecy, that is the right to keep information 
private; autonomy, that is the freedom from societal constrains and 
observation within one‘s own sphere; and seclusion, that is the right 
to be left alone. The extensive legal and philosophical review by 
Solove (2002) juxtaposes three additional aspects to Hirshleifer‘s 
ones: limited access to the self; control over personal information; 
and intimacy. Kang (1998) discusses privacy in terms of shielding 
one‘s own physical space; preserving one‘s own ability to make 
choice; and controlling the processing of information about oneself. 
This article focuses on the control over personal information, in 
Solove and Kang‘s meaning.  
Still the right to control over his own personal information not only 
deals with market-based and thereby voluntary disclosure. It also 
deals with the limitation of the right of the government or the 
judicature to access personal information, i.e. to coercive disclosure. 
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The focus is here restricted to voluntary disclosure of personal 
information. Finally, each legal system must define what information 
is personal information. For the moment, I do not need to be more 
specific, and this section refers to all information ―about himself‖ 
submitted by a user to a private intermediary, regardless of whether 
they would qualify as personal data under any privacy norm. It is 
worth mentioning that under EU law, personal information is any 
piece of information related to an identified or identifiable natural 
person.4 
A review of the economics of privacy needs to start from the 
contributions of the Chicago school (Posner 1979, Stigler 1980). 
Triggered from a new privacy statute in the USA, these scholars had 
a narrow focus on assessing the efficiency and the effectiveness of the 
individuals‘ right not to disclose certain information. They concluded 
that any regulation allowing not to disclose personal information in 
market transactions is ineffective and inefficient from a societal point 
of view. Absent legal constraints, rational decision-makers would 
optimally choose both how much information disclose and how 
much to invest in information discovery. If only the informational 
aspect of privacy is taken into account, there is nothing new under 
the sun. Information lubricates the market,5 and withholding 
personal information has no better effects than e.g. allowing sellers to 
conceal product defects.  
Chicagoans‘ original but narrow framing misses at least two 
important points. First, individuals do benefit from sharing certain 
personal information, but full disclosure is not in their best interest. 
A consumers ―will rationally want certain kind of information about 
                                                 
4  Art. 2 of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data. OJ L 281/31 23.11.1995. The new 
Commission proposal for a regulation on data protection changes the 
definition, possibly enlarging the class of personal information. Cf. Art. 4 of the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation). 
Regulation of the European Parliament and Of the Council. COM(2012)11, 
Brussels, 25/1/2012. 
5   Please remember that in the same decade the seminal articles on asymmetric 
information had been published. 
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themselves to be available to producers‖, as ―the transaction is made 
more efficient if detailed information about the consumer‘s tastes is 
available‖, but at the same time he would rationally conceal some 
data, as ―he doesn‘t want the seller to know how much he is willing 
to pay‖ (Varian 1996). 
Secondly, and possibly most importantly, if the focus is widened 
from a single transaction to the whole set of transactions with 
different counterparts, the analysis leads to very different results. 
Transaction after transaction, disclosure after disclosure, the 
individual: 
loses control of the personal information, and that information multiplies, 
propagates and persists for unpredictable span of time [...]. Hence, the 
negative utility coming from future potential misuses of offline personal 
information is a random shock practically impossible to calculate. (Acquisti 
2004)  
Through a wit metaphor, disclosing data is signing a blank check: it 
may never come back to the consumer, or it may come back with an 
arbitrary low or high figure on it (Acquisti 2010).  
Recognising that disclosing personal information in a certain 
transaction may result in costs for the data subject unrelated to that 
transaction means that the exchange of personal information is 
subject to a negative externality. More precisely, companies 
collecting personal data do not internalise future expected costs 
borne by individuals (Huang 1998; Lessig 2006). This externality 
implies that, compared to the societal optimum, individuals may 
over-disclose information and companies may over-invest in 
collecting information.  
Later contributions which complexify the previous analysis 
introducing second-best scenarios (Hermarlin and Katz 2006) 
showed that disclosure of personal information may both increase 
and decrease overall welfare, depending on the initial conditions. 
Although the sign of the efficiency effect is unclear, privacy norms 
will always result in distributional effects. 
The likelihood and amount of expected losses for data subjects had 
been skyrocketed by IT technologies. Personal data are nowadays 
collected, transferred and searched at a pace which was unthinkable 
before, creating additional and more dangerous threats to one‘s own 
sphere. Namely, IT technologies stretch the possible future state of 
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the worlds along two dimensions: probability and expected 
damages. We are faced with high-probability negligible-cost risks, 
such as spam; and high-cost low-probability risks, such as identity 
theft (Acquisti 2010; Brown 2010; LRDP Kantor 2010).  
High-cost low-probability risks can induce erratic and ―irrational‖ 
choice patterns, as demonstrated by behavioural economists in many 
fields (Kahneman 2011). Numerous authors (Acquisti 2004; Acquisti 
and Grossklags 2004; Berendt et al. 2005; Hui and Png 2006; 
Compañó and Lusoli 2010, Jolls 2010) show indeed that there are 
inconsistencies between individuals‘ preferences and actual 
information disclosure. Acquisti and Gross (2006) show that while 
privacy attitudes matter in the decision to whether to join Facebook 
or not – but only for the age cohorts and social groups for which 
Facebook is not a must-have platform – the amount of information 
actually disclosed by Facebook users is uncorrelated with their 
preferences for privacy. 
In general, privacy policies and statements are likely neglected by 
both privacy-savvy and privacy-reckless consumers. Very small, 
even nihil, rewards suffice for spurring disclosure. Acquisti and 
Grossklags (2004) identify several reasons to explain inconsistencies, 
such as: limited information on privacy issues; the complexity to 
compare certain upfront costs and uncertain future benefits; 
bounded rationality; psychological biases, in particular limited self-
control, hyperbolic discounting and underinsurance. Other 
inconsistencies noticed in privacy behaviours consist of the 
endowment effects, significantly stronger than for average goods, 
non-normal distributions of preferences, and order effects (Acquisti 
et al. 2009).  It is interesting to see how these features match Sunstein 
and Thaler‘s (2008) criteria to identify when rational actors may fail 
to take self-maximising decisions; therefore external intervention, 
such as some form of nudging, may be justified. 
Taken the behavioural analysis into account, it is quite difficult to 
predict the effect of different privacy policies. Acquisti (2010) 
concluded that ―the market equilibrium will tend not to afford 
privacy protection to individuals‖, and this can be a ground for 
privacy regulation. The empirical analysis shows (Bonneau and 
Preisbuch 2010) that the plethora of different privacy policies 
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proposed by social networks make hardly any difference in terms of 
user behaviours Certainly, claims that opt-in and opt-out policies 
make no difference to the user (as in Lacker 2002) can be rejected. 
Using the homo oeconomicus as the role-model for privacy economics 
would indeed prevent understanding the much ado about default 
settings, which indeed spark fire among online companies. For 
example, while in principle online advertisers do not oppose the Do 
Not Track IP header – which, in short, prevents websites from 
tracking user behaviours – they did fiercely oppose Microsoft 
decision to have Do Not Track on by default on Internet Explorer 10.6 
Had we been rational in our privacy decisions, online advertisers 
would not go to war for the default option. 
Even assigning property rights on private information to individuals 
is considered at risk of falling short of ensuring an effective privacy 
protection, especially if bounded consumers‘ rationality is accounted 
for (Varian 1996; Schwartz 2000; Hui and Png 2006; Lessig 2006; Prins 
2006). Indeed, under EU law, personal data are protected by a 
property rule, in Calabresi and Melamed‘s (1972) sense: the right to 
data collection and processing can be acquired by the counterpart 
only upon the user‘s consent.7 But even under a property rule, 
intermediaries face no real constraints in obtaining personal 
information from users. 
Lastly, the economic analysis of privacy norms should not forget that 
regulation may have an expressive function, regardless of its 
effectiveness, thereby raising users‘ awareness about their privacy 
rights. With respect to this function, one may argue that property 
rights are more ―expressive‖ than regulatory norms (Lessig 2006), or, 
rather the opposite, that a human right-based regime will reduce the 
                                                 
6  See The New York Times ‗Do Not Track? Advertisers Say ―Don‘t Tread on Us‖‗, 
published on 13 October 2012. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/technology/do-not-track-movement-
is-drawing-advertisers-fire.html (last retrieved on October 2012). 
7  I am not claiming that the EU approach is property-based. Clearly, it is human 
right- (or dignity-) based. Nevertheless, in the strictest technical meaning, art. 7 
of the EU Privacy Directive (infra note 37) confers the user a property rule-type 
of protection for collection and processing of personal data. See Kang and 
Buchner (2004) for a wit account of the similarities between a consent-based or 
property-based regime; and Prins (2006) for the similarities of a property-based 
regime and the current EU legal framework. 
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push for trading and disclosing personal data (Kang and Buchner 
2004). Still, this expressive function of law may have an impact on 
user attitudes, but no factual relevance has been shown in the 
literature as far as actual behaviours are concerned.  
In conclusion, most users will disclose most information in most 
cases, adopting no or low privacy protections, regardless of whether 
this is efficient from a static, dynamic, individual or societal point of 
view.8 This is due to both negative externalities and inconsistent 
behaviours. Both grounds can justify, and consequently should 
shape, pubic intervention to protect privacy. 
2.2 The Supply-Side: the Market Structure for Personal 
Information 
The markets in which intermediaries operate can be framed like a 
retail value chain, namely retailers of personal information. 
Intermediaries operate in an upstream market, collecting personal 
information from users, and in a downstream market, selling 
―matching‖ (broadly speaking: ads, suggestions, emails etc.)  
between the ―right‖ users and goods and services to advertisers. 
Users enter into contact, and often into a contract, with the 
intermediary to obtain goods or services. When this happens, 
intermediaries acquire users‘ personal information. In some cases, 
provision personal information is a condicio sine qua non for the 
performance of the contract. For example, buying books on Amazon 
requires delivering personal data for registration and about one‘s 
own purchase history (as purchases take place). In some cases, users 
can decide whether submitting some of the data requested. For 
example, to use Gmail, users have to submit a set of personal 
information for the registration of a Google account, but can refuse to 
allow indexation of their email content. Finally, in some cases users 
are free to choose whether to disclose personal information at all. For 
example, individuals can shop in supermarkets with or without 
subscribing to its loyalty programme.  
                                                 
8  Sure, there is a non-determined quota of non-users, i.e. of individuals deciding 
not to enter into a transaction with the intermediary because of privacy 
concerns.  
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The intermediary offers his goods and services ―in exchange‖ of 
users‘ personal information. In some cases, personal information is 
all that the intermediary asks. E.g. most email providers deliver free 
services in exchange of access to personal information. In other cases, 
submission of personal information allows the users to enjoy 
additional benefits, e.g. frequent flyer programmes, or lower prices, 
e.g. dedicated discounts in supermarkets.  
Whichever benefit is traded for personal information, consumers‘ 
data is an asset, sometimes the core asset, owned by the intermediary 
of personal information (Acquisti 2010). The consumer itself, or more 
precisely his/her personal information, becomes the product. 
Indeed, intermediaries bear a cost to harvest personal information. In 
other words, collection of personal information represents a cost for 
the intermediary, as the acquisition of any other input would.  
Based on the personal information retrieved, intermediaries build 
user profiles and use them as a mechanism to trigger matching, e.g. 
via targeted advertisements. Profiling users and connecting them 
with advertisements can either be done by the intermediary itself, 
that is ―first-party advertising‖, or be outsourced to specialised firms, 
such as advertising networks, that is ―third-party advertising‖; third-
party ad networks collect data from several websites and merge 
them into a single user profile (FTC 2009; Art29WP 2010; Beales 2010; 
OFT 2010; ENISA 2012).9 Delivery of the advertisement can take 
place either alongside of the delivery of intermediary‘s goods and 
services, e.g. Google search or Facebook, on a dedicated medium, 
such as Groupon emails or supermarket snail mails, or on the medium 
of another entity, such as in the case of advertising networks.  
On the downstream market, advertisers can be constructed as buyers 
of access to personal information-based profiles, which are used to 
deliver targeted messages. In most cases, personal information does 
not leave either the intermediary, in case of first-party advertising, or 
                                                 
9  For this reason, third-party advertising is considered potentially more 
dangerous for users‘ privacy. Indeed, in first-party advertising personal 
information does not ever leave the intermediary; on the contrary in third-party 
networks data is collected by several websites/publishers and then transferred 
to the ad platform, which merges it into a single user profile. This user profile is 
much ―deeper‖ than in case of first-party ads, and mixes information from 
various sources. 
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the advertising network, in case of third-party.10 Advertisers just buy 
the right to deliver an ad to certain class of profiled users. For 
example, a mechanic shop can asks Facebook to deliver an ad to all 
users who like Volkswagen and live in Brussels, but would not know 
the identities of targeted individuals.  
Advertisers can buy ads based on two pricing schemes: cost per 
impression or cost per click (Ratliff and Rubinfeld 2010). The former 
scheme is the most widespread across old media: advertisers pay a 
fixed price, usually expressed per thousand or million viewers (Cost 
per Million - CPM), to reach a certain amount of audience. Cost per 
click (CPC) is typical of online ads. In this case, advertisers pay a 
price each time a viewer clicks on the ads, thereby accessing the 
advertiser‘s premises, i.e. its website. The CPC scheme is replicated, 
to some extent, also on the offline world. For example, clubs use PRs 
as a marketing strategy. PRs give potential customers a coupon, 
which is uniquely signed. The club then pays each PR based on the 
amount of customers who actually accessed its premise. 
The two schemes are not ex ante Pareto-superior one to the other for 
advertisers. Assuming that, regardless of the pricing scheme, the 
same share of customers accessing the advertiser‘s premises 
subsequently enters into a transaction, an advertiser is indifferent 
when 
𝛼 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝑀 = 𝐶𝑃𝐶 
where  is the share of ad viewers accessing the advertiser‘s 
premises. 
However, the CPC scheme is superior on other dimensions. First of 
all, it creates information. The advertiser knows exactly and in real 
time how many targeted viewers acceded its premises, rather than 
having to estimate Therefore, CPC solves, partly, the conundrum 
for which firms ―waste half of the money spent in advertising, but do 
not know which half‖.11 Secondly, risk is shifted from advertisers to 
                                                 
10  E.g. ―For Google‘s paying customers—its advertisers—the information will be 
in a black box‖ (Picker 2009). He also rightly points out that if Google disclosed 
the private information, it would allow the advertiser to reach targeted viewers 
without passing through it, self-destroying its business model. 
11  John Wanamaker, quoted in Picker 2009. 
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the intermediary. If the campaign is unsuccessful, i.e. delivers no 
additional visitors, under CPM the advertiser bears the full cost, 
while under CPC the advertiser pays nothing and the intermediary 
bears the opportunity-cost of missed ad revenues. This in turn 
creates incentives for the intermediary to ensure that ads are 
channelled towards the mostly interested viewers (ENISA 2012), i.e. 
that those who value the good or service most will find it (Ratliff and 
Rubinfeld 2010). Under CPC, the advertiser is therefore sure that the 
intermediary will keep on its promises of looking for the most 
interested viewers, a promise which, as user profiles are not made 
public, would be hardly monitorable otherwise. 
For these reasons, I will assume that advertisers will opt for CPC 
when possible, although I am aware that there are specific reasons 
for which in some cases an advertiser prefers to opt for CPM scheme, 
e.g. to build brand recognition or in case of widespread consumer 
goods.12 Furthermore, as I will try to show in Section 3, CPM is de 
facto the only possible option when buying ads from intermediaries 
which have only statistical information about their users, rather than 
punctual individual profiles. 
Advertisers‘ surplus as a function of the number of users does not 
have a point of maximum, because marginal utility of audience, 
albeit diminishing, is never negative. Since under CPC the marginal 
cost to reach an additional user, that is its price, is 0, advertisers' 
surplus increases indefinitely when the number of viewers 
increases.13  
This happens because advertisers do not pay for a certain amount of 
viewers, but of clicks. Advertisers would buy as many clicks as 
                                                 
12  For example, Facebook offers both options. Cf.  
http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=219791638048948 (visited on 
September 2012). 
13  Formally, Gossen's second law is verified only for x approaching infinity, where 
is the audience (number of viewers). Gossen's second law states that: 
𝜕𝑈𝑥
𝜕𝑈𝑦
=
𝑝𝑥
𝑝𝑦
.In 
our case, x is the audience (number of viewers) and y is a basket representing 
all other goods. As px=0, for the equation to be verified 𝜕𝑈𝑥  is to be equal to 0. 
Nevertheless, the marginal utility of viewers is never nihil, if not approaching 
the limit to infinity: lim𝑥→∞ 𝜕𝑈𝑥 = 0.  
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possible, within their budget, as long as their expected profit per 
click is higher than the price (and 0 clicks afterwards) (Evans 2008). 
For this reason, advertisers enjoy Constant Unidirectional Network 
Externalities based on the numerosity of the audience: the higher the 
audience, the better (Luchetta 2012). 
In other words, the advertisers‘ demand function for audience is 
infinitely elastic. This assumption is common in the literature on the 
economics of advertisement (Spence and Owen 1977; Anderson and 
Gabszewicz 2006) and becomes a key feature of the market under the 
CPC pricing scheme. Indeed, infinite elasticity of the demand for 
audience is given by the fact that the demand of click saturates the 
budget as long as the expected profit per click is higher than the 
CPC.  
3 A taxonomy of Intermediaries 
All intermediaries follow a comparable business model. They harvest 
personal information from users, compile user profiles (either in-
house or via outsourcing) and match users‘ profiles with targeted 
advertisements. Nevertheless, they are, at first sight, very dissimilar 
companies, ranging from search engines to supermarkets, from 
financial institutions to social networks. In this section, I provide 
some coordinates of a tentative map of the world of intermediaries: a 
taxonomy which allows comparing entities which are similar as far 
as the intermediation of personal information is concerned 
First of all, intermediaries differ in the relative significance of the 
matching activity. Groupon gets all of its revenues from matching 
consumers and dealers. Google search engine gets most of its 
revenues from advertising,14 and so does Facebook.15  LinkedIn is a 
social network as Facebook, but only 26% of its revenues come from 
advertising.16 Television channels may be fully or partially funded by 
                                                 
14  Cf. Google financial statement for 2011 
15  Cf. http://techcrunch.com/2012/05/03/stats-facebook-made-9-51-in-ad-
revenue-per-user-last-year-in-the-u-s-and-canada/ (visited on September 2012) 
16 Cf. http://techcrunch.com/2012/05/03/linkedin-beats-the-street-q1-revenue-
up-101-percent-to-188-5m-net-income-up-140-percent/ (visited on September 
2012) 
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ads, or ads-free (in the latter case, they do not belong to the category 
of intermediaries). Other intermediaries get much lower revenues, as 
they basically do intermediation on top of their main business 
activity, For example, supermarkets get very low revenues directly 
from ads, because they usually deliver internal ads only.17 It may be 
useful to broadly identify four categories of intermediary models 
along this dimension:  
1) pure intermediary model: share of revenues from matching 
activity: 81-100%;  
2) significant intermediary model: 51-80% 
3) partial intermediary model: 15/20-50% 
4) marginal intermediary model: <15/20%. 
Another distinction which can be made is between online and offline 
intermediaries. Online intermediary are facilitated in harvesting and 
processing personal information, and in real-time matching of 
visitors and advertisements, but they are not the only relevant 
category. Off-line intermediaries feature notable examples, such as 
providers of communication services, financial institutions, old 
media, and supermarkets. Truly, the relevance of the intermediary 
model is higher in the online economy. Most offline intermediaries 
are either marginal or partial intermediaries, with the exception of 
media. 
Intermediaries can collect either statistical or punctual information 
about their users. Statistical information is typical of old media: by 
buying a certain newspaper or watching a certain TV programme, I 
reveal statistical information about myself. Namely, I am more likely 
to have a certain age, education degree, political orientation, interests 
and so on and so forth (Picker 2009). Punctual information consists of 
collecting specific data about each user. Both statistical and punctual 
profiles are used to channel advertisements, although the underlying 
ad logic is quite different. A hotel in Rome will prefer matching its ad 
to punctual profiles of individuals travelling to Rome, while 
producers of mass consumption goods may find efficient to 
broadcast ads to a large but only statistically profiled audience. 
Statistical information is usually associated to CPM pricing schemes 
                                                 
17  In theory, one could measure the additional revenues due to targeted own-
promotions through loyalty programmes. 
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and allows for different marketing strategies, such as raising brand 
awareness. 
Intermediaries can differ as for the relevance of the personal 
information to which they have access to their productive process, In 
general, the literature distinguishes between functional and non-
functional information, i.e. between information which is necessary 
for delivering the good/service and the rest. Information relevance is 
taken into account in devising data protection policies by several 
authors (Kang 1998; Novotny and Spiekermann 2011). Given the 
technological and market development, we propose a more granular 
taxonomy of information into four categories:   
1. Information is non-functional when it is irrelevant for the good 
or service that the intermediary delivers. For example, a 
telephone company could access the content of my SMS, but 
this information is irrelevant for its task, that is delivering my 
SMS to the receiver. The same goes with email content vis-à-vis 
my email provider, or Internet traffic with regards to my 
Internet Service Provider (ISP). 
2. Information is functional when it is used by the intermediary to 
improve the quality of its service. For example, Google search 
engine uses search history to improve the quality of search 
results;18 insurance companies collect as many data as possible 
for a better pooling; and financial institutions ask for credit 
history to match the conditions of a loan with its riskiness.  
3. Information is necessary when the good or service cannot be 
delivered otherwise. For example, a telephone company needs 
to know to whom I am sending the SMS; Google search engine 
needs to know my search query.   
4. Finally, for some intermediaries information is itself the object 
of the transaction, therefore the last category is labelled 
                                                 
18  Cf. Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection: Opinion 1/2008 on data 
protection issues related to search engines. ―While search engine providers 
inevitably collect some personal data about the users of their services, such as 
IP address, resulting from standard HTTP traffic, it is not necessary to collect 
additional personal data from individual users in order to be able to perform 
the service of delivering search results and advertisements.‖ 
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information-object. This is the case of social networks, where the 
personal information sharing is itself the service offered, rather 
than an ancillary condition. Belonging to the class of 
intermediaries of information-object implies that prevents 
anonymisation is not a viable strategy to protect personal 
information. A Google search or a phone call can be 
anonymised; an anonymous social network would be of no use 
(Picker 2009). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that a single intermediary can access 
one or more classes of information. 
Finally, a last distinction should be made between intermediaries 
having a medium on which carrying out the matching activity, e.g. 
delivering advertisements, and intermediaries without such a 
medium. Old media, Google and Facebook can transmit 
advertisements alongside of their content. Supermarkets, Groupon 
and telephone companies cannot, and have to create dedicated 
supports (emails, snail mails, telemarketing etc.) to deliver targeted 
ads. 
Figure 8 below summarises the typologies of intermediaries. 
Figure 8 – Taxonomy of Intermediaries 
Intermediaries of Personal Information
Significance
Pure
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Partial
Marginal
Condition
Online
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Nature of 
Information
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The position of the company over these five dimensions is important 
to develop the intermediary business model in details. First of all, the 
company should understand whether it can be a pure or marginal 
intermediary. This depends on business strategies, i.e. whether 
intermediation is the only activity undertaken or just a way to raise 
additional revenues from an untapped resource (i.e. from personal 
information collected for other purposes). The degree of 
intermediation also depends on the amount of personal information 
collected: if a company collects personal information at the margin of 
its activity, such as supermarkets, insurance companies or banks, it 
will not be in a position to become a pure or significant intermediary. 
The degree of intermediation also depends on whether the company 
is brick and mortar only or has an online presence too. In the latter 
case, it will be easier to directly and indirectly harvest personal 
information, and the online presence will also provide a channel to 
deliver ads. If the company has not a medium to deliver ads, it must 
create one in order to profit from intermediation or sell its 
information to a medium-endowed company, and that must be 
addressed ex ante in devising the strategy. Finally, consumers are 
more likely to relinquish personal information when it is necessary 
or functional to the provision of goods or services. Submission of 
non-essential information, especially in the offline world, may be 
resisted as an excessive intrusion of privacy. For example, consumers 
strongly reacted to the decision of British Telecom to carry out a pilot 
project for retrieving personal information from subscribers‘ Internet 
traffic (Person 2010), whilst they mind much less when a telephone 
company reviews our traffic pattern (which is an information 
necessary for billing) to offer a better tariff plan. 
4 Competition and Regulation of Intermediaries 
So far we investigated the independent variable of the logical 
relation between intermediation of personal information and its 
economic regulation. Namely, we investigated the behaviours of 
actors in the market for privacy, both consumers and firms, and the 
proposed a taxonomy to coalesce similar entities. Now, it is time to 
investigate the dependent variable, that is the economic regulation of 
intermediaries of personal information. The question is whether 
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economic regulation takes into account the independent variables, 
i.e. provides a level playing-field to intermediaries which adopt the 
same business model (Picker 2008). 
Intermediaries of private information span through different 
industries. Therefore, they are subject to different sectoral regulations 
and, for competition law purposes, operate in different relevant 
markets. I claim that regulation and competition policy have so far 
overlooked intermediaries of personal information as a group of 
firms adopting the same business model and therefore competing 
among each others. Legal analysis has not yet been able to keep the 
pace with the evolution of business models, especially, but not only, 
in the online ecosystem (Renda 2011a).  
Currently, firms carrying out the same activity are subject to 
different norms and constrains. This may put some of them at a 
disadvantage, up to preventing the implementation of an 
intermediary business model. In short, some firms can make money 
by using personal information to raise ad revenues; some others 
cannot, or can but only at a higher cost.  Usually, brick and mortars 
firms and infrastructure providers are regulated more strictly than 
online companies (Picker 2008). E.g., financial institutions in the US 
have to obtain users‘ opt-in content to employ their personal (non-
sensitive) information for advertising, and must send a yearly 
summary of their privacy policies.19 These requirements are much 
higher than those imposed on other US companies, such as Google or 
Facebook.  
Below, I provide two more detailed cases, one for regulation and one 
for competition law. In the former, I try to demonstrate that the same 
behaviour is regulated differently depending on the type of 
intermediary, with obvious consequences in terms of the ability to 
raise ad revenues and therefore on the relative competitive position. 
In the latter, I try to show how competition policies failed to 
understand competition mechanisms, and thus to properly define the 
relevant markets, when dealing with a search engine intermediary 
such as Google.  
                                                 
19  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 15 USC, Subchapter I, Sec. 6801-6809 
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4.1 Email scanning vs. Deep Packet Inspection 
Most email providers deliver their services for free to consumers.20 
Or, as I tried to argue in this paper, they provide email services as an 
in-kind payment for users‘ personal information. Email providers 
generate revenues from ads and by providing professional services 
to business customers. Although disaggregated revenue data is not 
available, as the most widespread providers are part of largest 
conglomerates, it is fair to consider email providers as pure or 
significant intermediaries. 
Email providers have access to essential, functional and non-
functional information. Essential information is e.g. the addressee of 
my email, or my IP address. Functional information is e.g. the 
contacts to whom I write most, so that the provider can highlight for 
me mails from these contacts as ―important‖. Non-functional 
information is the content of my emails. The providers need not to 
know what I am writing about, but this can be a precious source of 
personal information. And two of the three largest web-based email 
providers,21 that are Gmail and Yahoo!Mail, scan email content to 
deliver targeted ads.22 This is acknowledged in their privacy policies, 
and an opt-out is offered to users.23 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) would be in a comparable position, 
but it is harder for them to access the data they transmit for 
intermediation purposes. ISPs sit over a mine of personal 
information, as whatever we are doing on Internet is conveyed 
through their ―pipes‖, i.e. their fibre, cable and copper 
                                                 
20  I chose to compare email providers and telecom operators because of the 
similarities of their services. The same analysis could be extended, mutatis 
mutandis, to compare tracking cookies and deep packet inspection, as they both 
aim at tracking browsing behaviours. 
21  Cf. http://litmus.com/blog/email-client-market-share-stats-infographic-june-
2012/email-client-market-share-june-2012 (visited on September 2012) 
22  Hotmail (Microsoft‘s), the other member of the ―big three‖, pledged not to scan 
emails content. It delivers targeted ads based only on cookie technologies. Cf. 
http://www.microsoft.com/privacystatement/en-gb/core/default.aspx and 
http://blogs.computerworld.com/15898/microsoft_bets_youre_scared_of_goo
gle (visited on September 2012) 
23  Cf. http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/uk/yahoo/mail/ymail/ and 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/ads/#toc-personalize 
(visited on September 2012) 
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infrastructures. Very few ISPs, unlike email providers, attempted to 
access non-functional information, that is to observe their 
subscribers‘ Internet traffic in some details. This is to some extent 
surprising, as the depth and breadth of this potential source of 
personal information makes email content and search queries 
appallingly smaller (Person 2010). 
Real-time access to IP packets as they are travelling on the net is 
possible via the Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology. This 
technology is actually mandatory for American ISPs, to allow 
government surveillance of IP traffic for security reasons. On top of 
that, DPI can be used for network security, network management, 
and targeted advertising (Collins 2010; Daly 2011). I will restrain my 
focus to the latest purpose. 
In principle, the mechanism is the same as for email scanning. Both 
email providers and ISPs wish to access the content of my 
communication and use this information to match targeted ads. 
Always in principle, I am entitled to confidentiality both concerning 
my emails and my Internet traffic. Still, under EU law, the two 
situations are treated differently. 
Art. 5.1 of the ePrivacy Directive24 requires Member States to ensure 
confidentiality of communications and the related traffic data, and 
prohibits surveillance without the user‘s consent. Email scanning 
amount to communication surveillance and as such is to undergo 
user‘s consent. The issue is what constitutes legitimate consent. 
Email providers can do so on an opt-out basis: first you get an email 
address and then, should you wish, you can opt-out from content 
analysis.  
Differently, providers of public communication networks wishing to 
process traffic data, such as ISPs using DPI technology for 
advertising purposes, are subject also to art. 6 of the ePrivacy 
directive. This article prohibits storage of traffic data for non-
                                                 
24  Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 
2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications). OJ L 201, 31.07.2002, p. 37. See also Opinion 2/2010 on online 
behavioural advertising of the Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection. 
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functional purposes, as long as data are not used to provide value 
added services. Value added services are defined (sic!) as any service 
requiring processing of traffic data, thereby the exception covers 
targeted advertising. Nevertheless, art. 6 exception requires opt-in 
consent. The failure of the United Kingdom to require opt-in consent 
for DPI led the European Commission to open an infringement 
procedure,25 the most serious legal action that the Commission can 
undertake against a Member States allegedly non-compliant with a 
Directive (Daly 2011). The United Kingdom later promulgated an act 
requiring opt-in consent for DPI (OFT 2010), and the infringement 
procedure was subsequently dismissed.26 
As it has been argued in Section 2.1, opt-in and opt-out policies are 
not equivalent, an opt-in policy requires more effort from ISPs and 
lowers participation rate, thereby reducing collection of personal 
information and hence ad revenues. Clearly, DPI is quantitatively 
different from email scanning: more data are harvested from 
consumers. Still, there is no qualitative difference between the two 
behaviours. In both cases a communication provider wants to access 
non-functional confidential information, that is content, to deliver 
target ads. In both cases, the user is to waive the right of 
confidentiality to allow access to this information. Why email content 
is considered less confidential and private than Internet traffic (or 
SMSs, or voice calls or any other communication service), such as to 
require opt-in over opt-out, is yet to be fully explained. 
4.2 Google vs. Facebook 
Competition authorities have considered Google as operating in a 
two-sided market, whose sides are online advertising and search 
results.27 Although the European Commission has not yet cleared 
this stance, it is also possible that the online advertising market will 
eventually be split, and that Google relevant markets will be defined 
                                                 
25  Cf. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/570 & 
 format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (visited on 
September 2012) 
26  Cf. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/60&type 
 =HTML (visited on September 2012) 
27  European Commission Decision of 19/02/2010 Case No COMP/M.5727 - 
Microsoft/ Yahoo! Search Business, §47. 
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as search results and online search advertising.28 Basically, at least in 
Europe, Google relevant market will be Google itself. 
On the contrary, in the real world Google perceives to have 
threatening competitors. Surprisingly, it is not about other search 
engines, but about Facebook. Indeed, they both do money in the 
same way: collecting personal information and hence matching users 
and ads. Therefore, they are threats to each other. 
Facebook and Google both are intermediaries of personal 
information. They are very similar along most of the dimensions of 
intermediation. The share of ad revenues qualifies them as pure 
intermediaries;29 they operate online collecting punctual information, 
and they both have a medium to convey ads to the user. They differ 
only as to the kind of information collected, as Facebook deals with 
the information-object type while Google search engine does not.30 
If competition analysis considered Facebook and Google as 
intermediaries of personal information, it would emerge clearly that 
they are fighting in (for?) the same relevant market, something which 
was already suggested by few authors (Picker 2009; Alexandrov et al. 
2011; Renda 2011a). In a nutshell,31 advertisers want to deliver 
targeted ads based on a large amount of personal information and 
are likely to consider both Google and Facebook as competing 
intermediaries.   
Competition and regulatory authorities failed so far to grasp the 
mechanisms of platform completion, which is the main competitive 
force in the Internet ecosystem. Therefore, they hence failed to ensure 
regulatory symmetry, in particular pressing on infrastructure 
providers or software producers, while being looser with over-the-
                                                 
28  Cf. the non-binding opinion from the French Competition Authority: Autorité 
de la Concurrence, Opinion No 10-A-29 of 14 December 2010 on the competitive 
operation of online advertising. 
29  The share of revenues from advertising in 2011 amounts to 96% for Google and 
85% for Facebook. Cf. Google Financial Table, available at: 
http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html (last retrieved on November 
2012); Facebook Prospectus for the Initial Public Offering.  
30  Of course Google+ does, but we focus on the search engine only to keep the 
case simpler. 
31  For a more detailed analysis cf. Luchetta 2012. 
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top players, such as content providers (Renda 2011a). Were it 
acknowledged that many players of the Internet ecosystem are 
indeed intermediaries of personal information fighting for the same 
market, competition analysis would become sounder. In particular 
market definition needs no longer to end up in single-product-
markets,32 and, most importantly, platform competition can finally 
be taken into proper account as the main explananatory variable of 
market conducts. 
5 Cloud Computing Providers 
I continue exploring the logical relationship between intermediation 
of personal information and its economic regulation by focusing on 
cloud computing providers. Cloud computing providers are very 
important actors with respect to intermediation of personal 
information because it has been predicted (Picker 2008, 2009) that 
they will be the most important intermediaries of the near future. 
Cloud providers are the ―new web intermediaries at the heart of Web 
2.0 hav[ing] access to an enormous datastream about their users.‖  
Cloud computing has already started to change the way in which 
consumers and firms employ IT technologies. Word processing, data 
storage, apps development, and many more tasks are, or at least can 
be, transferred to the cloud. And, according to quasi-unanimous 
consent, the best has yet to come.  
Cloud computing providers are clear candidates to implement the 
intermediary business model, and several, such as Google‘s Gmail 
are. The mine of data to which cloud providers have access is very 
rich, possibly the richest so far (Picker 2008; Gervais 2012). Indeed, 
the more our activities will take place in the cloud, the larger 
datastream we will produce. In perspective, it may be even bigger 
than traffic data available to ISPs: file storage and document 
compilation will disclose private information which is currently only 
                                                 
32  For example, in the competition cases brought about by the Commission 
against Microsoft, Intel and Google itself. For Microsoft, Cf. Commission 
Decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
Case COMP/37.792; for Intel, cf. Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 
COMP/37.990 Intel.  
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Tesi di dottorato di Giacomo Luchetta, discussa presso  
l‘Università LUISS Guido Carli, soggetta a Licenza Creative  
Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere derivate 3.0 
Antitrust and Regulation in the EU  
The Law and Economics of Intermediaries of Personal Information 
 
marginally conveyed through the Internet (Picker 2009). Cloud 
providers score, across all dimensions, as potentially successful 
intermediaries: pure and main intermediation has been shown to be 
a viable strategy in this industry; they may have a medium over 
which ads are conveyed, i.e. the thin cloud client; they operate 
online; and they have access to punctual information. In addition to 
that, for the vast majority of cloud providers, this datastream will 
consist of functional or essential information, i.e. the cloud provider 
will need to access it to perform its task. This is likely to bring about 
lower resistance to its harvesting. 
Currently, intermediation of personal information, funded via 
advertising, is not the only, and for some services not the dominant, 
business model for cloud computing. Therefore it is important to 
understand whether this is a business strategy or, rather, depends on 
the privacy legal framework applicable to cloud computing 
providers. 
The importance of cloud providers among the inhabitants of the 
Internet ecosystem is set to grow. Cloud services are likely to 
reinforce the tendency for revenues to move into the upper layers of 
the ecosystem, extracting value from players whose products have 
been to some extent, commoditised, such as infrastructures and 
software (Renda 2011b). Nevertheless, cards are re-shuffling across 
all layers, since firms from lower layers are becoming cloud 
providers, such as infrastructure providers, software manufacturers 
or business service providers. Internet players can build upon their 
core competences and customer relationships to sell cloud services to 
users, and in doing so can move from commoditised to higher value 
layers. E.g. Microsoft is leveraging its Microsoft Office to enter the 
cloud, IBM and large telecom operators are leveraging their existing 
business relationships for the same purpose. Such a strategy could be 
complemented, even boosted, by an ad-funded model for cloud 
computing. Although I am not sure whether such a scenario is 
realistic, it would be interesting to see whether a telecom operator 
could expand into cloud computing and harvest personal 
information up to the point of providing free internet connectivity 
paid by ads. 
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The technical and economic framework of cloud computing, which is 
described in Section 5.1, is quite established by now. On the contrary, 
the legal framework is still puzzling companies and legal scholars. 
Crucially, the possibility of implementing the intermediary business 
model depends on the legal regime applicable to personal data and 
private information in the cloud. Under EU law, but also in other 
legal systems, privacy, ownership and use of private information in 
the cloud are far to be clear, therefore a review of these aspects is 
provided in Section 5.2. 
5.1 Technical and Economic framework  
The borders of cloud computing are hard to define. As bluntly put by 
Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle, ―I can't think of anything that isn't 
cloud computing with all of these announcements‖.33 In some cases, 
cloud computing includes also what had been previously defined as 
web 2.0, that is any website with user generated content remotely 
stored, such as YouTube or Facebook. For sake of this paper, web 2.0 
operators are considered as a different category of intermediaries 
(see also Picker 2009). Under the label cloud computing, in this paper 
I include firms which deliver IT services on demand, be it software, 
or hardware tasks such as storage and computational power, over a 
network.  
According to the definition of the US National Institute for Standards 
and Technology: 
[c]loud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and 
released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction.34 
Authors (Ambrust et al. 2009; Wyld 2009; Höfer and Karagiannis 
2011; Renda 2011b; Yoo 2011; Gervais 2012) whilst adopting different 
definitions mostly agree on the main characteristics of cloud 
computing: 
                                                 
33  Quoted in Sluijs et al. 2011 
34  Definition retrievable at: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-
145/SP800-145.pdf (visited on September 2012) 
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1. Virtualisation, that is the possibility of running different and 
multiple virtual machines  over a set of physical infrastructures; 
2. Scalability, that is the possibility to allocate hardware resources 
according to users‘ needs; 
3. Multitenancy, that is the possibility for different users to access 
the same resources; 
4. User configurability; 
5. Quality-of-service; 
6. Accessibility over the Internet by any device; 
7. Pay-per-service. 
Although there is disagreement among IT experts (e.g. Ambrust et al. 
2009), cloud computing providers are usually classified in three 
categories: 
1. Software As A Service: providers of finished applications, such 
as Google‘s Gmail or Microsoft‘s Office 365; 
2. Platform As a Service: providers of an environment for 
developing applications, usually including an operating 
system, programming languages and other software 
development tools. E.g. Google‘s App Engine or Microsoft‘s 
Azure. 
3. Infrastructure As A Service: providers of hardware resources, 
such as processing, storage or other computing tasks. E.g. 
Amazon‘s EC2, Dropbox. 
Potential impacts of cloud computing, once the technology is fully 
developed, are huge. In a fully cloud-based environment, computing 
power is transformed in a utility (Yoo 2011). Firms only have to 
install ―thin‖ clients, whilst computing power is delivered on 
demand by large installations, as electricity is. Indeed, Wyld (2009) 
claims that it may represent a change as significant as the 
electrification of factories. Even before computing fully became a 
utility, economic impacts of adopting cloud computing are manifold: 
costs reduction; conversion of IT capital expenditures into 
operational expenditures, and therefore lower barriers to entry; 
economies of scale, due to lower unitary cost of processing and 
storage for mega data centres; aggregation of demand, leading to a 
higher usage ratio of equipments (Ambrust et al. 2009; Wyld 2009; 
Höfer and Karagiannis 2011; Marston et al. 2011; Yoo 2011). 
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Microeconomic impacts and efficiency gains will translate into 
macroeconomic effects. According to Etro (2011), cloud computing 
will stimulate economic growth through different channels: 
increasing business creation and job creation; fostering job 
reallocation towards more productive sectors; and improving public 
finance accounts by reducing expenditures and increasing revenues. 
All in all, cloud computing could increase GDP in the EU by 0.1% to 
0.4% per year. For the US, estimates are up to 0.8-1% additional GDP 
growth per year (Iansiti e Richards 2011). 
5.2 The legal framework 
Under EU law, cloud providers do not benefit from a dedicated legal 
framework. As information society services, they are covered by the 
legal framework on e-commerce (Sluijs et al. 2011).35 Nevertheless, 
the e-commerce directive aims at ensuring the freedom of providing 
e-services throughout the Internal Market rather than at 
comprehensively regulating a class of operators. Namely, it deals 
with principles such as the freedom of establishment, the applicable 
jurisdiction, remedies, and with secondary liability. On the contrary, 
it is not all clear the positioning of cloud computer providers under 
other EU law branches, that are sectoral regulation and privacy law.  
In Europe, sectoral TLC regulation has been tailored over two 
canonical firms: communication service providers and content 
providers. Communication service providers undergo a detailed and 
quite strict regulatory framework, concerning the authorisation 
regime, access and interoperability of networks, data portability, 
non-discrimination, universal-service just to name a few.36 
                                                 
35  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, 
in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce). OJ L 178/1 17.7.2000. 
36  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and Council on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated 
facilities (Access Directive) OJ L 108/7 24.4.2002; Directive 2002/20/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic 
communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) OJ L 108/21 
24.4.2002; Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services (Framework Directive) OJ L 108/33 24.4.2002, Directive 
2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on universal 
service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services (Universal Service Directive) OJ L 108/51 24.4.2002. Commission 
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Nevertheless, cloud providers seem to escape the legal definition of 
communication providers. At the same time, they lack ―editorial 
control‖, which would qualify them as content providers (Sluijs et al. 
2011). Indeed both frameworks would not fit cloud providers. As 
they do not (yet?) operate an infrastructure which can be qualified as 
an essential facility, they need not the detailed regulatory framework 
for communication providers. Still, some of the issues therein 
regulated, e.g. interoperability or data portability, are relevant for the 
law and economics of cloud computing as well. For this reason, they 
are also unlikely to benefit from the looser regulation on content 
providers. An undefined regulatory framework, e.g. on 
interoperability, could create expectations of vendor lock-in, thereby 
stifling market take-off (Balboni 2010, Marston et al. 2011). 
EU Privacy law37 finds direct application for cloud providers. 
Although many scholars discussed the issue and criticised the 
indeterminacy of a framework which was not thought for cloud 
computing and could undermine its development (i.a. Hon et al. 
2011a, b; Balboni 2011), two points seem hard to contest: 
1. Cloud providers process data which are ―personal‖ in the 
meaning of the directive, thereby falling within its scope of 
applications;38 
2. Cloud providers, a fortiori if generating revenues via targeted 
ads, are to be considered as data controllers as they, at least in 
some occasions, determine the means and the purposes of data 
processing. 
The EU privacy law has important implications in terms of i.a. data 
security, data treatment, data transferability, but it does not prevent 
a cloud provider to implement an intermediary business model. 
Everything it needs to do is obtaining consumers‘ consent to harvest 
personal information from users‘ cloud datastream. To a limited 
extent, email providers are already doing so. Other operators are 
likely to follow once a critical mass of users, crucial to attract 
                                                                                                                            
Directive 2002/77/EC on competition in the markets for electronic 
communications networks and services OJ L 249/21 17.9.2002. 
37  Privacy Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 4. Directive on e-privacy, supra note 24. 
38 The only reasonable exception being the provider of storage-only services 
requiring users‘ encryption of data.  
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sufficient advertisers because of the Constant Unilateral Network 
Externalities, switches to cloud-based non-mail services (Renda 
2011b, quoting Gartner‘s analysis). 
It could be questioned, as Reed (2010) does, whether the provider has 
any right of ownership on personal information harvested from data 
that the user has entrusted to the cloud. Reed argues that data 
created by the user belongs to the user, while data generated by the 
operator from data created by the user belongs to the operator. 
Harvested personal information can be used for revenue-generating 
activities as long as i) it is not disclosed to third parties without the 
user‘s consent; ii) it is not used to compete against the user; or iii) to 
make profits which could have been made by the user. As long as the 
re-use of personal information is not concealed and as long as the 
consumer is arguably enjoying lower prices because of the re-use of 
―his‖ personal information, nihil obstat for the intermediary. 
As data harvesting is permitted under privacy law and ownership 
rights do not prevent cloud providers for making profit out of users‘ 
personal information, what happens in the cloud is then a matter of 
contract law (Reed 2010; Robison 2010; Gervais 2012). The terms of 
reference of the contracts for the provision of services of cloud 
computing will dictate what cloud intermediaries will or will not be 
able to do with personal information. Some commentators (i.a. Ozer 
and Conley 2010) notice that most privacy policies look like a 
unilateral appropriation of rights on users‘ data by cloud 
intermediary. Some kind of competition over privacy exists, but only 
for goods and services sold at positive price, while zero-price 
services showed less of variation over privacy policies (Presibuch 
and Bonneau 2011). The law and economics analysis would say that 
data usage rights are not ―salient‖ for consumers, and therefore 
intermediaries will draft ―unfair‖ terms to appropriate as much 
surplus as possible (in the framework of Korobkin 2003). On top of 
that, economics of privacy showed that users‘ behaviours are not 
responsive to better privacy policy (cf. Section 2.1). Nevertheless, 
Microsoft is marketing Office 365 as a privacy friendly cloud service, 
stating that it will never harvest private information from users‘ 
documents. It will be interesting to see whether cloud computing, as 
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e.g. music distribution, will become a battle between brands such as 
Microsoft and free ad-funded cloud intermediaries. 
6 Conclusions 
Thanking the reader for coming so far, I would like to point out the 
reason why this research was undertaken and to summarise its main 
results. We currently miss a holistic analysis of intermediaries of 
personal information. They represent the most important class of 
firms in the online ecosystem, and are important actors also among 
brick and mortar companies. Still, in many cases legal and economic 
analysis looks at them through scattered lenses. I have tried to stress 
that this class of firms is characterised by a similar business model, 
that is collecting information from users to match users with goods 
and services. This is how intermediaries generate revenues. This 
similarity is often neglected because both economic and legal studies 
focus on the different goods and services that intermediaries provide 
to users in exchange of personal data, rather than on the data 
themselves. 
To build this framework, it is necessary to start from three main 
pillars. The first consists of realising that, as Gervais (2012) claims, 
value in the current online ecosystem is built upon connection rather 
than scarcity. The second consists of understanding the economics of 
privacy, which explains the micro-behaviour of consumers facing a 
choice whether to disclose or not personal information. Personal 
information-intermediaries can exist because, in the current setting, 
most consumers will disclose most information in most cases; and 
their business model can thrive because intermediaries can precisely 
exploit the insights about consumers‘ privacy choices. Thirdly, the 
supply side is to be taken into account, acknowledging and framing 
the business models of intermediaries of personal information. This 
business model, with some degree of variation, is applied regardless 
of the goods and services provided to the customers. 
Once this framework is laid out, it is possible to cast a taxonomy of 
personal information-based intermediaries to compare similar 
entities. Their characteristics vary across five dimensions: i) the share 
of revenues generated by the intermediating activity; ii) whether 
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they operate online or offline; iii) whether they collect statistical or 
punctual information; iv) the relevance of the information collected 
to the business process; v) whether they possess a medium. 
Depending on where intermediaries are positioned across these five 
dimensions, they can adopt different strategies to monetise their 
personal information. 
Nevertheless, regulation and competition policy is still blind to the 
analysis of intermediation of personal information, and regulates 
intermediaries exclusively based on their sector of activity. It implies 
that firms which (are willing to) adopt a similar strategy to exploit 
their data set face different regulations. This is the case illustrated in 
Section 4.1, where it is shown that e-mail providers and telecom 
operators cannot process in the same way the same non-functional 
information (i.e. the content of the communication they convey) in 
order to deliver targeted ads. As for competition policy, Section 4.2 
shows that the failure to analyse the competitive environment in 
which both Google and Facebook operate leads to skewed results in 
the definition of the relevant market, and to considering firms facing 
real competition from other major operators as monopolists. Finally, 
the analysis of the cloud computing sector showed that whether the 
intermediary model can be adopted will depend on the legal 
framework deemed applicable to cloud computing providers. 
This is only a first attempt to explore this sector. Further research 
could profit by proceeding over two directions. First, from an 
economic point of view, it would be useful to go further in the 
description of the market for personal intermediaries, modelling 
them in a more detailed manner than the fresco provided in this 
paper. Secondly, from a legal point of view, it would be useful to 
review and assess all the instances in which regulation is not tailored 
to the personal information business model and creates disparities 
among different players. 
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